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ABSTRACT
Aggregate Economic Implications of New Technologies in Energy Industry
by
Xinya Zhang
This thesis studies technological progress in the energy sector and the transition
path from fossil fuels to renewable energy, with a particular emphasis on the conse-
quences to the whole economy. Currently, there is an active discussion regarding sub-
sidizing renewable energy sources, which are often portrayed as the sole future source
of energy and the driver of significant employment and economic growth. However,
innovation in the fossil fuel sector and its continuing development can also be a game
changer and should not be ignored.
In the first chapter, we use a dynamic general equilibrium model with endogenous
technological progress in energy production to study the optimal transition from
fossil fuels to renewable energy in a neoclassical growth economy. We emphasize
the importance of modeling technology innovation in the fossil fuel sector, as well
as in the renewable energy industry. Advancements in the development of shale
oil and gas increase the supply of fossil fuel. This implies that the “parity cost
target” for renewables is a moving one. We believe that this important observation
is often neglected in policy discussions. Our quantitative analysis finds that these
advancements allow fossil fuels to remain competitive for a longer period of time.
While technological breakthroughs in the fossil fuel sector have postponed the
full transition to renewable energy, they have also created many jobs and stimulated
local economies. In the third chapter, we use an econometric analysis to compare job
creation in the shale gas and oil sectors with that in the wind power sector in Texas.
The results show that shale development and well drilling activities have brought
strong employment and wage growth to Texas, while the impact of wind industry
development on employment and wages statewide has been either not statistically
significant or quite small.
The first and third chapters question the current enthusiasm in policy circles for
only focusing on alternative energy. Chapter 2 provides some theoretical support
for subsidizing renewable energy development. Here we develop a decentralized ver-
sion of the model in Chapter 1 and allow for technological externalities. We analyze
the efficiency of the competitive equilibrium solution and discuss in particular dif-
ferent scenarios whereby externalities can result in an inefficient outcome. We show
that the decentralized economy with externalities leads to under-investment in R&D,
lower investment and consumption, and delayed transition to the renewable economy.
This may provide an opportunity for government action to improve private sector
outcomes.
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1Chapter 1
Energy Sector Innovation and Growth: An
Optimal Energy Crisis
Abstract
We study the optimal transition from fossil fuels to renewable energy in a neoclas-
sical growth economy with endogenous technological progress in energy production.
Innovations control fossil energy costs even as increased exploitation raises mining
costs. Nevertheless, the economy transitions to renewable energy after about 80%
of available fossil fuels are exploited. Learning-by-doing effects in renewable energy
production imply that the transition to renewable energy occurs before the cost of re-
newable energy reaches parity with fossil fuel costs. Consumption and output growth
rates decline sharply around the transition, which we thus identify as an “energy
crisis”. The energy shadow price remains more than double current values for over 75
years around the switch time, resulting in a continued drag on output and consump-
tion growth. The model thus highlights the important role that energy can play in
influencing economic growth.
1.1 Introduction
Since the days of the industrial revolution, economic growth has been powered by fos-
sil fuels. In recent decades, large-scale energy production through renewable sources
has become technologically feasible, albeit expensive and as yet uncompetitive with-
2out subsidies. For two reasons, renewable energy will eventually become competitive
and replace fossil fuels as the economy’s main energy sources. First, innovation, as
well as experience through learning-by-doing, will lower the costs of new technologies.
Second, fossil fuels are finite resource that will become more scarce over time. Admit-
tedly, technological progress can slow any associated escalation in costs by expanding
the quantity of economically viable resource, as has been dramatically illustrated by
the recent expansion of oil and natural gas production from shale, and oil production
from Canadian oil sands. Technological progress in the form of improved energy effi-
ciency can also reduce the amount of fuels needed to provide a given level of energy
services. Nevertheless, the expanding demand for energy resulting from economic and
population growth implies that fossil fuel costs ultimately will rise.1
The finite supply of fossil fuels raises concern that the need to transition to more
expensive alternatives will impose substantial costs on the economy. It is often argued
that these costs are sub-optimal and should, if possible, be reduced via appropriate
policies (Farrell & Brandt 2006).2 In a simple growth model that allows for tech-
nological progress in energy production, however, we show that an ” energy crisis”
around the time the economy optimally abandons fossil fuels can be efficient.
Formally, we study the optimal transition path from fossil fuels to renewable en-
ergy sources in a neoclassical growth economy with endogenous technical progress in
energy production. We then study the consequences of such innovation for macroeco-
nomic growth, including around the time of transition from fossil fuels to renewable
1DOE/NETL (2007) summarizes several forecasts for the likely year of peak conventional oil
production.
2 The possible macroeconomic costs of an energy transition are distinct from any environmental or
congestion externalities associated with using different energy sources. We do not discuss the latter
in this paper. In addition, since our model is long run in nature and does not involve uncertainty, we
do not model temporary energy crises due to unanticipated supply or demand shocks and binding
short-run production capacity constraints.
3energy sources. As in Hartley & Medlock III (2005), we assume that energy is needed
in order to produce the economy’s single consumption good. Energy can come from
two sources: fossil fuels and renewable sources. The renewable technology combines
capital with an exogenous energy source (for example, sunlight or wind) to produce
energy services. Throughout the paper, we assume for simplicity that the energy
services of fossil fuels and the renewable technology are perfect substitutes.3
A central feature of our analysis involves the explicit modeling of technological
progress in both the fossil and the renewable energy production technologies. In
particular, while mining costs increase with cumulative resource development, ad-
vancements in mining technologies can keep the cost of supplying fossil fuel energy
services under control for some time.4 We model technological progress in renewables
by assuming that accumulated knowledge lowers unit production cost until a tech-
nological limit is attained. We assume a two-factor learning model, whereby direct
R&D expenditure can accelerate the accumulation of knowledge about the renewable
technology.
We calibrate the model using data from the Energy Information Administration
(EIA), the Survey of Energy Resources, and the GTAP 7 Data Base produced by
the Center for Global Trade Analysis in the Department of Agricultural Economics,
Purdue University. The last data source provides a consistent set of international
accounts that also take account of energy flows. We then compute the optimal path
of investment in both the fossil fuel and the renewable energy sectors.
3Fossil and renewable energy sources therefore are not employed at the same time in our model.
Extending the model to allow simultaneous use of different energy sources is an important issue for
further investigation.
4The mining technology variable can also be thought of as a reduced form means of capturing
the effect of energy efficiency improvements. By reducing the resource input needed to provide a
given level of energy services, efficiency improvements also slow down the rise in costs from resource
depletion.
4The calibrated model gives rise to several different regimes, which are depicted
graphically in Figure 1.1 below. Initially, growth occurs through the use of fossil fuels
while investment in the fossil fuel technology keeps energy costs from rising substan-
tially.5 However, fossil energy investments, which must be made at an increasing
rate to keep costs under control as resources are depleted, eventually cease. Shortly
thereafter, fossil fuels are no longer used and renewable energy powers the economy.
0
Fossil fuel use
Renewables investment
R > 0, n > 0,
B = 0, j = 0
R = 0, n = 0,
B > 0, j > 0
p declining
Renewables use
T2T0
Fossil fuels investment
R = 0, n = 0,
B > 0, j = 0
p constant
T1
R > 0, n = 0,
B = 0, j = 0
Figure 1.1 : Regimes of energy use and investment
Interestingly, the transition from fossil fuels to renewable energy occurs when the
cost of fossil energy is less than the initial cost of renewable energy. The reason is
that the learning-by-doing element of renewable energy production lowers the shadow
price (or full cost) of renewable energy, making it worthwhile to transition before the
explicit cost of fossil energy reaches the initial cost of renewable energy.
Once the economy shifts to renewable energy, investment in the renewable tech-
nology makes it more effective over time. Immediately after the transition, a spurt of
renewable R&D investment produces a steep decline in renewable energy costs for ten
to fifteen years. Renewable costs then decline more gradually for a long time, initially
5Short-run spikes in energy prices result more from binding production capacity constraints than
longer-run depletion. We would need to introduce supply and demand shocks and excess production
capacity to model such short-run crises. Energy prices also fluctuate more in reality than in our model
because we have assumed gradual technological progress and associated expansions in recoverable
resources, whereas in practice we see periodic breakthroughs amidst steady improvements.
5mostly as a result of both learning-by-doing and later through both learning-by-doing
and growing investment in R&D. The latter then drops to zero as the technological
limit is approached.
Finally, the economy enters a regime where the technological frontier in renew-
able energy has been reached and the cost of renewable energy is constant. In this
regime, the model becomes a simple endogenous growth model with investment only
in physical capital. In addition to being realistic, the technological limit on renew-
able efficiency facilitates the numerical solution of our model by allowing the terminal
regime to be solved analytically.
Numerical simulation of the model reveals that per capita output grows at an
average rate of 4.22% per annum (p.a.) in the fossil regime, 3.11% p.a. in the renew-
able regime with investment in R&D, and 4.07% p.a. in the long run with renewable
energy at its minimum cost. Growth in per capita consumption averages 3.68% p.a.
in the fossil energy regime and 3.33% p.a. in the renewable regime with R&D. In the
long run regime, per capita capital, consumption, investment in capital, and energy
use all grow at the same rate of 4.07% p.a. The gaps between output and consump-
tion growth in the earlier regimes result from investment in energy production and
the changing cost of energy over time. In the fossil regime, consumption grows slower
than capital (and output) because the rising cost of energy and rising investment
in mining both take increasing resources away from consumption. In the renewable
regime with R&D, the declining cost of energy allows consumption to grow faster
than output.
Toward the end of the fossil regime, investments in mining technology are rather
large, while investments in renewable technology also tend to be relatively large im-
mediately following the transition to renewable sources. As a result, around the tran-
6sition point the shadow price of energy jumps substantially, while consumption and
investment in capital decline as shares of output. In this sense, our model predicts an
“energy crisis” around the switch point. Although consumption remains close to its
current share of around 60% of output for the first fifty years of the fossil fuel regime,
it plunges to well below 40% of output at the switch date. The shadow relative price
of energy peaks at the switch time and is more than double current levels for over 75
years around the switch time. After the transition, the high cost of renewable energy
prevents the consumption share from rising back above 55% of output for another
150 or so years. We emphasize that these are features of the optimal allocation in
our model.
We also wish to emphasize the importance of modeling progress in fossil, as well
as in renewable energy production. Currently, there is an active discussion regarding
subsidizing renewable energy sources. Advances such as shale oil and gas, oil sands
production in Canada, and deep water exploration increase the supply of fossil fuels
and imply that the “parity cost target” for renewables is a moving one. We believe
that this important implication is often missing in the policy discussions. Our quanti-
tative findings assert that these advancements allow fossil fuels to remain competitive
for a longer time. Ultimately, the model implies that about 80% of the technically
recoverable fossil fuel resources in place will be exploited, with the transition to re-
newable energy occurring at the end of this century.
1.2 Related literature
Our approach is related to a number of papers in the literature. Parente (1994)
studies a model in which firms adopt new technologies as they gain firm-specific
expertise through learning-by-doing. He identifies conditions under which equilibria
7in his model exhibit constant growth of per capita output. As in most of the literature
on economic growth, Parente abstracts from issues related to energy.
Chakravorty et al. (1997) develop a model with substitution between energy
sources, improvements in extraction, and a declining cost of renewable energy. They
find that if historical rates of cost reductions in renewables continue, a transition to
renewable energy will occur before over 90% of the world’s coal is used. Our model is
complementary to theirs. By modeling investment in energy technologies, we generate
an endogenous transition to renewable energy. The explicit presence of investment in
physical capital also allows us to explore the endogenous trade-off between the cost
of energy and economic growth, which is the focus of our work. Unlike Chakravorty
et. al., we do not study the implications of energy use for carbon dioxide emissions
and we do not conduct policy experiments.
More recently, Golosov et al. (2011) built a macroeconomic model that incorpo-
rates energy use and the resulting environmental consequences. They derive a formula
describing the optimal tax due to the externality from emissions and provide numeri-
cal values for the size of the tax in a calibrated version of their model. However, they
abstract from endogenous technological progress in either fossil fuels or renewables.
As a result, transitions between different energy regimes are exogenous in their model.
van der Ploeg (2012) use a growth model to investigate the possibility of a “green
paradox”, that is a tendency for promotion of renewable energy to accelerate the
exploitation of fossil fuels by lowering resource rents and thus the opportunity cost
of extraction. Innovation in their model differs from ours, which is motivated by
industry experience curves. In addition, we model technological progress in fossil
fuels and we calibrate our model using world-economy data.
A paper that is closest to ours is Acemoglu et al. (2012). They study a growth
8model that takes into consideration the environmental impact of operating “dirty”
technologies. They examine the effects of policies that tax innovation and production
in the dirty sectors. Their paper focuses on long run growth and sustainability and ab-
stracts from the endogenous evolution of R&D expenditures. They find that subsidiz-
ing research in the “clean” sectors can speed up environmentally friendly innovation
without resorting to taxes or quantitative controls on carbon dioxide emissions, with
their negative impact on economic growth. Consequently, optimal behavior in their
model implies an immediate increase in clean energy R&D, followed by a complete
switch toward the exclusive use of clean inputs in production.
Our work differs from Acemoglu et al. (2012) by explicitly connecting R&D, en-
ergy, and growth. This follows from our focus on the effects of the energy technology
transition on growth rather than environmental issues. Nevertheless, allocations in
our model can be interpreted as laissez-faire or “business as usual” scenarios where
environmental externalities associated with energy use are ignored. The resulting
transition between energy sources in the two models is very different. A major rea-
son is that we model technological progress in both the renewable and the fossil fuel
sectors. More generally, most of the literature ignores the key idea that advances in
fossil fuel extraction and end-use efficiency technologies are of first-order importance
in addressing the energy transition question.
91.3 The Model
1.3.1 Production Technology
We assume that per capita output6 y can be written as a linear function of a per
capita stock of capital, k:7
y = Ak. (1.1)
Capital depreciates at the rate δ, while investment in new capital is denoted by i:
k˙ = i− δk. (1.2)
Energy is also needed to produce output, which could be written as a linear
function of k as well:
E =
(u

)
k, (1.3)
where the ratio of utilization of capital u and energy efficiency  would reflect efficiency
and structure of the economy over time. In the thesis, we assume u and  grow at
the same rate and define units to set the ratio of them to A. Thus, at each moment
of time, we have
y = E = R +B, (1.4)
6Although we model economic activity in continuous time, indexed by t, we usually simplify
notation by omitting t as an explicit argument.
7As is well known, this could be regarded as a reduced form of a model where investment, for
example in human capital, allows the “productive services” supplied by inputs to expand even if
the physical inputs remain fixed. Hence, the marginal product of capital does not decline as k
accumulates.
10
where R ≥ 0 is the per capita energy 8 derived from fossil fuel resources that is used
to produce goods. We assume that the per capita renewable energy supply B ≥ 0 is a
perfect substitute for the energy produced from fossil fuel burning. This assumption
is admittedly extreme and it is mainly adopted for simplicity.9
Letting c denote per capita consumption of the sole consumption good, we assume
that the lifetime utility function is given by:
U = max
∫ ∞
0
e−βτ
c(τ)1−γ
1− γ dτ, (1.5)
where e−βτ is the discount factor.
1.3.2 Fossil Fuel Supply
Higher rates of both population growth and per capita economic growth will increase
the rate of depletion of fossil fuels. Let Q denote the (exogenous) population and
assume that it grows at the constant rate pi. The total fossil fuels used will then be
QR. Depletion then implies that the marginal costs of resource extraction increase
with the total quantity of resources mined to date, S, which is the integral of QR:
S˙ = QR. (1.6)
As a result of technical change in mining and fossil energy use, the marginal cost
of extracting the resources needed to supply a unit of fossil energy services, g(S,N),
8Although “energy” is more properly thought of as an input into the energy sector, and “energy
services” an output, we use the terms interchangeably.
9Using a continuity argument, we can show that our results remain true if the degree of substi-
tutability is large, but not perfect. See Hassler, Krusell, and Olovsson (2011) for a discussion of
desirable short and long-run substitution elasticities in this context.
11
depends not only on S but also on the state of technical knowledge N . Investment
in mining technology,10 or the efficiency with which fossil fuels are used to provide
useful energy services,11 leads to an accumulation of N :
N˙ = n, (1.7)
which is not assumed to depreciate over time. We then assume that g(S,N) is given
by the following function, which is illustrated in Figure 1.2:
g(S,N) = α0 +
α1
S¯ − S − α2/(α3 +N) = α0 +
α1(α3 +N)
(S¯ − S)(α3 +N)− α2 (1.8)
S¯ − α2
α3 +N
Marginal 
cost
α0
S
Figure 1.2 : Marginal cost of energy from fossil fuels
Intuitively, for a fixed level of technology, the marginal costs of extraction are
increasing and convex in the amount of resources extracted already. The maximum
10Examples include horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing, deep sea/arctic drilling, and 4D-
seismic.
11Since we have defined the energy supplies in efficiency units, improvements in energy efficiency
also reduce the per-unit cost g(S,N) of supplying an additional unit of R.
12
fossil fuel resource that can be extracted at any given time is S¯−α2/(α3 +N), and the
marginal cost of extraction rises rapidly as this temporary capacity limit is reached.
Investment in new technologies expands the temporary capacity limit and the flat
portion of the marginal cost curve to the right, extending the competitiveness of
fossil fuels.12 Of course, this process inevitably reaches a natural limit as fossil fuel
resources are bounded by S¯, the absolute maximum technically recoverable fossil fuel
resources. This upper limit is only available asymptotically as the stock of investment
in new fossil fuel technology N → ∞. Even then, arbitrarily large costs would be
incurred in recovering all the technically available resources S¯. The terms α0, α1, α2
and α3 in (1.8) are parameters. The partial derivatives of the fossil fuel cost function
g(S,N) are derived in the Appendix A .1.
For energy to be productive on net, we need the value of output produced from
energy input to exceed the costs of producing that energy input. In particular, when-
ever fossil fuel is used to provide energy input, we must have 1 > g(S,N). Function
(1.8) implies that this constraint eventually must be violated, as exhaustion of fossil
fuel resources increases g(S,N).
1.3.3 Renewable Energy Technologies
We use m to denote the marginal cost (measured in terms of goods) of the energy
services produced using the renewable technology. For the renewable technology
to be productive on net, we require m < 1. In effect, the renewable technology
combines some output (effectively, capital) with an exogenous energy source (for
example, sunlight, wind, waves or stored water) to produce more useful output than
12This notion is related to, but also distinct from, the green paradox mentioned in the literature
review.
13
has been used as an input.
We allow for technological progress by assuming that m declines as new knowl-
edge is gained. Even so, there is a limit, Γ2, determined by physical constraints,
below which m cannot fall. Explicitly, using H to denote the stock of knowledge
about renewable energy production, and Γ1 the initial value of m (when H = 0), we
assume:13
m =

(Γ1 +H)
−α, if H ≤ Γ2−1/α−Γ1,
Γ2, otherwise,
(1.9)
for constant parameters Γ1, Γ2 and α. We assume that Γ1
−α > g(0, 0), so that
renewable energy is initially uncompetitive with fossil fuels.
Following the learning-by-doing literature (Klaassen et al. 2005)14, we assume
a two-factor learning model, whereby direct R&D expenditure j can accelerate the
accumulation of knowledge about the renewable technology arising from its use:
H˙ =

Bψj1−ψ, if H ≤ Γ−1/α2 −Γ1,
0, otherwise.
(1.10)
In particular, once H reaches its upper limit, further investment in the technol-
ogy would be worthless and we should have j = 0. The parameter ψ determines
how investment in research enhances the accumulation of knowledge from experience.
Klaassen et al. (2005) derive robust estimates suggesting that direct R&D is roughly
13This functional form is motivated by the literature on experience (or learning) curves. See, for
example, International Energy Agency (2000).
14 In their paper, they estimated a two-factor learning curve model that allowed both capacity
expansion (learning-by-doing) and direct public R&D to produce cost reducing innovations for wind
turbine farms in Denmark, Germany and the UK. They interpret their results as enhancing the
validity of the two-factor learning curve formulation.
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twice as productive for reducing costs as is learning-by-doing. Hence, we assume that
ψ = 0.33.
1.3.4 The Optimization Problem
Goods are consumed, invested in k, N , or H, or used for producing fossil fuels or
renewables. This leads to a resource constraint (in per capita terms):
c+ i+ j + n+ g(S,N)R +mB = y. (1.11)
The objective function (1.5) is maximized subject to the differential constraints
(1.6), (1.7), (1.2) and (1.10) with initial conditions S(0) = N(0) = 0, k(0) = k0 > 0
and H(0) = 0, the resource constraint (1.11), the definitions of output (1.1), energy
input (1.4) and the evolution of the cost of renewable energy supply (1.9). The
control variables are c, i, j, R, n and B, while the state variables are k, H, S and N .
Denote the corresponding co-state variables by q, η, σ and ν. Let λ be the Lagrange
multiplier on the resource constraint. We also need to allow for the possibility that
either type of energy source is not used and investment in cost reduction for the energy
technology is zero. To that end, denote µ the multiplier on the constraint j ≥ 0, ω
the multiplier on the constraint n ≥ 0, ξ the multiplier on the constraint R ≥ 0 and
ζ the multiplier on the constraint B ≥ 0. Finally, let χ be the multiplier on the
constraint H ≤ Γ2−1/α−Γ1 on the accumulation of knowledge about the renewable
technology.
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Define the current value Hamiltonian and thus Lagrangian by
H = c
1−γ
1− γ + λ
[
Ak − c− i− j − n− g(S,N)R− (Γ1 +H)−αB
]
+ (R +B − Ak)
+ q(i− δk) + ηBψj1−ψ + σQR + νn+ µj + ωn+ ξR + ζB + χ[Γ−1/α2 −Γ1 −H]
(1.12)
The first order conditions for a maximum with respect to the control variables
are:
∂H
∂c
= c−γ − λ = 0 (1.13)
∂H
∂i
= −λ+ q = 0 (1.14)
∂H
∂j
= −λ+ (1− ψ)ηBψj−ψ + µ = 0;µj = 0, µ ≥ 0, j ≥ 0 (1.15)
∂H
∂n
= −λ+ ν + ω = 0, ωn = 0, ω ≥ 0, n ≥ 0 (1.16)
∂H
∂R
= −λg(S,N) + + σQ+ ξ = 0, ξR = 0, ξ ≥ 0, R ≥ 0 (1.17)
∂H
∂B
= −λ(Γ1 +H)−α + + ηψBψ−1j1−ψ + ζ = 0, ζB = 0, ζ ≥ 0, B ≥ 0 (1.18)
The differential equations for the co-state variables are:
q˙ = βq − ∂H
∂k
= (β + δ)q − λA+ A (1.19)
η˙ = βη − ∂H
∂H
= βη − λα(Γ1 +H)−α−1B + χ;
χ[(Γ
−1/α
2 −Γ1 −H] = 0, χ ≥ 0, H ≤ Γ−1/α2 −Γ1
(1.20)
σ˙ = βσ − ∂H
∂S
= βσ + λ
∂g
∂S
R (1.21)
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ν˙ = βν − ∂H
∂N
= βν + λ
∂g
∂N
R. (1.22)
We also recover the resource constraint (1.11) and the differential equations for the
state variables, (1.2), (1.10), (1.6) and (1.7).
1.3.5 The evolution of the economy
In this section, we argue that the economy will evolve through various regimes of
energy use and energy technology investment. The following sections will analyze the
different regimes in detail, working backwards through time.
We assume that parameter values are set so that initially all energy services are
provided by lower cost fossil fuels. As fossil fuels are depleted by both population
and per capita economic growth, however, the shadow price of energy services  will
rise. Although investments in N moderate the increase in fossil fuel costs, eventually
the value of  from (1.17) will rise to equal the value of  in the renewable regime
obtained from (1.18). At that time, which we will denote T1, the economy switches
to use only renewable energy and all use of, and investment in, fossil fuel technologies
ceases.
The co-state variable σ corresponding to the state variable S satisfies σ = ∂V/∂S,
where V denotes the maximized value of the objective subject to the constraints. In
particular, σ = 0 at T1 since S has no effect once fossil fuels cease to be used. Also,
since an increase in S raises the cost of fossil fuels while fossil fuels are used, σ will be
negative for t < T1.
15 Hence, (1.17) implies that the shadow price of energy exceeds
15Formally, if σ(τ) > 0 for τ < T1, since ∂g/∂S > 0, (1.21) would imply σ˙ > 0 and σ > 0 for
all t ≥ τ contradicting σ(T1) = 0. Heal (1976) introduced the idea of an increasing marginal cost
of extraction to show that the optimal price of an exhaustible resource begins above marginal cost,
and falls toward it over time. This claim is rigorously proved in Oren and Powell (1985). See also
Solow and Wan (1976).
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λg(S,N) for t < T1 but converges to it as t→ T1.
Once the economy starts to use renewable energy, both the accumulation of expe-
rience and explicit R&D investment will raise H. Eventually, however, the economy
will attain the technological frontier for renewable energy efficiency at another time
T2. Explicit investment j in H then will cease. Since changes in H have no further
effect on maximized utility beyond T2, the co-state variable η corresponding to H
must satisfy η = ∂V/∂H = 0 at T2. For t ∈ [T1, T2), η > 0 since an increase in H will
lower the shadow price of energy services and raise V .16 In particular, we must have
η > 0 at T1 with η ↓ 0 as t→ T2.
It is conceivable that investment j in H could become worthwhile prior to T1 when
renewable energy begins to be used. Observe from (1.15), however, that so long as
B > 0 we must also have jψλ ≥ (1− ψ)ηBψ > 0. Also, when j > 0, it must satisfy
j = [(1− ψ)(η/λ)]1/ψB (1.23)
and we conclude that B > 0. Thus, j > 0 if and only if B > 0.
Since the total energy input requirement R+B = Ak, B must immediately jump
from 0 to Ak > 0 as R declines from Ak to 0 at T1. Hence, j also becomes positive for
the first time at T1 and we must also have H = 0 at T1. Then (1.18) and continuity
of the shadow price of energy at T1 will require
 = λg(S,N) = λΓ−α1 − ηψBψ−1j1−ψ. (1.24)
In particular, (43) implies that the transition from fossil fuels to renewable energy
16Formally, if η(τ) ≤ 0 at τ ≥ T1, (1.20) would imply η˙ < 0 and η < 0 for all t ≥ τ contradicting
η(T2) = 0.
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will occur when the mining cost of fossil energy, g(S,N), is strictly less than the
initial cost of renewable energy Γ−α1 . Thus, the benefits of learning-by-doing make
it worthwhile to transition to renewable energy before the cost of fossil fuels reaches
parity with the cost of renewable energy.
While we have shown that we cannot have j = 0 while B > 0, we will have a
regime where investment in fossil fuel technology n = 0 while fossil fuels continue to
be used (R > 0). Specifically, since changes in N , like changes in S, have no effect
once the economy abandons fossil fuels at T1, the co-state variable ν corresponding
to N satisfies ν = ∂V/∂N = 0 at T1. On the other hand, (1.14) implies λ = q > 0,
so from (1.16), ω = λ− ν > 0 and hence n = 0 at T1. For t < T1, increases in N will
reduce fossil fuel mining costs and raise the maximized value of the objective subject
to the constraints, so ν = ∂V/∂N > 0.17 As we move backwards in time from T1, ν
will be increasing while λ is decreasing. Hence, we will arrive at a time T0 < T1 when
ν = λ, and for t < T0 we will have n > 0 in addition to R > 0. From (1.16), we will
also continue to have ν = λ for t < T0.
In summary, we have shown that the economy will pass through the regimes
illustrated in the time line in Figure 1.1.
We begin our detailed analysis with the last regime, describing economic growth
once the technological limit in energy production is reached.
1.3.6 The Long Run Endogenous Growth Economy
When the cost of the renewable energy source is constant at m = Γ2, the stock of
knowledge about renewable energy production H is no longer relevant. The model
17Formally, if ν(τ) < 0 for τ < T1, since ∂g/∂N < 0, (1.22) would imply ν˙ < 0 and ν < 0 for all
t > τ , contradicting ν(T1) = 0.
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becomes a simple endogenous growth model with investment only in physical capital.
We retain the first order conditions (1.13), (1.14) and (1.18), the first co-state equation
(1.19), the resource constraint (1.11) and the differential equation (1.2) for the only
remaining state variable k. However, (1.18) changes to simply  = λΓ2. From (1.14)
we will obtain q = λ and hence q˙ = λ˙, and the co-state equation (1.19) becomes
λ˙ = [β + δ − (1− Γ2)A]λ ≡ A¯λ, (1.25)
where A¯ is a constant. If we are to have perpetual growth, we must have c → ∞ as
t→∞, which from (1.13) will require λ→ 0 and hence A¯ < 0, that is18
A(1− Γ2) > β + δ. (1.26)
Condition (1.26) has an intuitive interpretation. With B = y and m = Γ2, A(1− Γ2)
equals output per unit of capital net of the costs of supplying the renewable energy
input. To obtain perpetual growth, this must exceed the cost of holding capital
measured by the sum of the depreciation rate (the explicit cost) and the time discount
rate (the implicit opportunity cost). Hereafter, we assume (1.26) to be valid. The
solution to (1.25) can be written
λ = K¯eA¯t (1.27)
for some constant K¯ yet to be determined. Thus, in this final regime, the resource
constraint, the first order condition (1.13) for c and (1.27) imply
k˙ = (β − A¯)k − K¯−1/γe−A¯t/γ (1.28)
18Note that (1.26) will require A > (β + δ)/(1 − p¯) > β + δ, which is the usual condition for
perpetual growth in a simple linear growth model.
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which, for another constant C0, has the solution
k = C0e
(β−A¯)t +
γK¯−1/γe−A¯t/γ
βγ − A¯(γ − 1) . (1.29)
However, the transversality condition at infinity, limt→∞ e−βtλk = 0, requires C0 = 0
and A¯(γ − 1) < βγ.19 In summary, we conclude that the value of k in the final
endogenous growth economy will be given by
k =
γK¯−1/γe−A¯t/γ
βγ − A¯(γ − 1) (1.30)
with λ given by (1.27) and K¯ is a constant yet to be determined.
1.3.7 Renewables with Technological Progress
Working backwards in time, we consider next the regime where B = Ak > 0, j > 0
and H < Γ
−1/α
2 −Γ1. As we observed above, the solution for j in this regime is given
by (39). Hence, H˙ will be given by:20
H˙ = [(1− ψ)(η/λ)](1−ψ)/ψB = [(1− ψ)(η/λ)](1−ψ)/ψAk. (1.31)
For B > 0, (1.18) implies ζ = 0 , while H < Γ
−1/α
2 − Γ1 and (1.20) imply χ = 0.
The solution (39) for j therefore also implies that the shadow price of energy will be
19Note that since A¯ < 0 the inequality will be satisfied if γ > 1, while if 0 < γ < 1, it will require
Γ2 > 1− [β/(1− γ) + δ]/A. Thus, for γ < 1, we need β/(1− γ) > A(1− Γ2)− δ > β.
20Hence, if η/λ evolves slowly over time H will approximately equal a constant times accumulated
past production of renewable energy B. Under these circumstances, empirical studies may find that
energy production cost and accumulated output alone follow a power law relationship, and that
experience is more productive in reducing costs than the underlying structural model assumes. As
(39) shows, the reason is that direct R&D also grows along with B.
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given by:
 = λ(Γ1 +H)
−α − ψ(1− ψ)(1−ψ)/ψλ(ψ−1)/ψη1/ψ. (1.32)
Substituting (1.32) into (1.19) and noting that q = λ implies q˙ = λ˙, we obtain
λ˙ =
[
β + δ − A(1− (Γ1 +H)−α)
]
λ− ψA(1− ψ)(1−ψ)/ψλ(ψ−1)/ψη1/ψ. (1.33)
From (1.20) with B = Ak, we obtain
η˙ = βη − λα(Γ1 +H)−α−1Ak. (1.34)
The resource constraint, the first order condition (1.13) for c and the solution (39)
for j with B = Ak determines i and hence the differential equation for k˙:
k˙ = Ak
[
1− (Γ1 +H)−α − (1− ψ)1/ψη1/ψλ−1/ψ
]− λ−1/γ − δk. (1.35)
In summary, we conclude that the economy with renewables and technologi-
cal progress will be characterized by four simultaneous differential equations (1.31),
(1.33), (1.34) and (1.35) for the four state and co-state variables k, H, η, and λ.
1.3.8 The Initial Fossil Fuel Economy
Finally, we consider the initial regime where R > 0. Then (1.17) implies ξ = 0 and
the shadow price of energy will be
 = λg(S,N)− σQ. (1.36)
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As noted above, σ will be negative until the end of the fossil fuel regime at T1 when
σ = 0. It then follows from (1.36) that the shadow price of energy  is unambiguously
positive.
While investment in fossil fuel technology is productive, that is n > 0, (1.16)
implies ω = 0 and hence ν = λ. But then ν˙ = λ˙ and (1.22) implies
λ˙ = βλ+ λ
∂g
∂N
R (1.37)
If we also have i > 0, (1.14) will imply λ = q and from (1.19) and (1.36), we will also
have λ˙ = (β + δ + g(S,N)A− A)λ− σQA. Using (1.37) we then conclude
[
δ + g(S,N)A− ∂g
∂N
R− A
]
λ = σQA (1.38)
Note that since σ < 0 and λ = c−γ > 0, a necessary condition for (1.38) to hold is
that
δ + g(S,N)A− ∂g
∂N
R < A (1.39)
Since we have assumed, however, that g(S,N) eventually increases above 1 as S
grows, and ∂g/∂N < 0, constraint (1.39) must eventually be violated and we cannot
have R > 0 and n > 0 forever. We will assume, however, that parameters are chosen
so that R > 0 and n > 0 at t = 0.
Substituting R = Ak into (1.38), we obtain an equation relating N and k, which is
maintained by active investment in the two types of capital. Specifically, differentiat-
ing the resulting expression with respect to time, substituting for N˙ , λ˙/λ = ν˙/ν, S˙, σ˙
and Q˙ = piQ (since the exogenous growth rate of Q is pi), and using (1.38), we obtain
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a condition relating i and n:
λ
[
∂g
∂N
(n+ δk +
σQAk
λ
− i)− ∂
2g
∂S∂N
QAk2 − ∂
2g
∂N2
nk
]
= σpiQ. (1.40)
We obtain a second relationship from the resource constraint. Specifically, using
the result that j = 0 if B = 0, the first order condition (1.13) for c, the produc-
tion function (1.1), and the energy input demand requirement (1.4), the resource
constraint (1.11) implies:
i = Ak[1− g(S,N)]− λ−1/γ − n (1.41)
Substituting (1.41) into (1.40), we then obtain an equation to be solved for energy
technology investment n in the fossil fuel regime:
nλ
(
∂2g
∂N2
k − 2 ∂g
∂N
)
=
λ
[
∂g
∂N
[k(δ + g(S,N)A− A+ σQA
λ
) + λ−1/γ]− ∂
2g
∂S∂N
QAk2
]
− σpiQ.
(1.42)
Using the signs of the partial derivatives of g given in the appendix, one can show
that (1.42) likely yields n > 0 as hypothesized.21 Using the solution for n and the
current values of the state and co-state variables, (1.41) can be solved for i.
In summary, we conclude that the initial period of fossil fuel use with both i > 0
21Since ∂g/∂N < 0 and ∂2g/∂N2 > 0, the coefficient of n on the left hand side of (1.42) is positive.
From the resource constraint (1.41), δk +Ak(g − 1) + λ−1/γ = δk − i− n ≤ δk − n. Thus n > 0 if
− ∂
2g
∂S∂N
QAk2 +
∂g
∂N
(δ +
σQA
λ
)k − σpiQ > 0.
Since ∂2g/∂S∂N < 0 and σ < 0, the quadratic in k has a positive second derivative and positive
intercept, so even if δ+ σQA/λ > 0, so the roots are both positive, we conclude that the expression
must be positive for large k. For small values of k, we are likely to have k˙ = i − δk > 0, in which
case the right hand side of (1.42) is guaranteed to be positive.
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and n > 0 produces five differential equations for k, S, N , σ, and λ:
k˙ = i− δk (1.43)
S˙ = QAk (1.44)
N˙ = n (1.45)
σ˙ = βσ + λ
∂g
∂S
Ak (1.46)
λ˙ = λ(β + δ + (g(S,N)− 1)A)− σQA (1.47)
together with the exogenous population growth Q = Q0e
pit.
As we argued above, the region where R > 0 and n > 0 will end at some T0 < T1
and between T0 and T1, we will have n = 0 and R > 0. In this region, N is fixed at
N¯ , and the resource constraint together with the first order condition (1.13) for c will
imply
i = Ak[1− g(S, N¯)]− λ−1/γ. (1.48)
In addition, we will now have separate differential equations for λ and ν. Specifically,
ν˙ will now be given by (1.22) whereas, since we will still have λ = q and R > 0, λ˙ will
continue to satisfy (1.47). The equations for k˙, S˙ and σ˙ will also continue to satisfy
(1.43), (1.44) and (1.46).
1.4 Calibration
In order to judge whether the effects of energy costs on growth are quantitatively
significant, we need to calibrate the parameters and solve the model numerically.
The numerical solution procedure is discussed in the Appendix A .1. In this section
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we discuss the data used to calibrate the parameters.
For convenience, we take the current population Q0 = 1 and effectively measure
future population as multiples of the current level. We will assume that the population
growth rate is 1%.22 In line with standard assumptions made to calibrate growth
models, we assume a continuous time discount rate β = 0.05. From previous analyses,
we would expect the coefficient of inter-temporal substitution γ23 to lie between 1
and 10.. The higher the γ, the less variability the household wants his consumption
pattern to show along the time. However, there is no strong consensus on what the
value should be. For most of our calculations, we assumed that γ = 4, although we
examined some results for a few larger and smaller values of γ. As one would suspect
from the result that the long run growth rate of the economy is, from (1.30), given
by −A¯/γ, changes in γ primarily alter base level economic growth rates, but do not
much affect deviations from those growth rates as a result of energy costs.
To calibrate values for the initial production, capital and energy quantities we
used data from the Energy Information Administration (EIA) 24, the Survey of Energy
Resources 2007 produced by the World Energy Council25, and The GTAP 7 Data Base
produced by the Center for Global Trade Analysis in the Department of Agricultural
Economics, Purdue University26. The last mentioned data source is useful for our
purposes because it provides a consistent set of international accounts that also take
22 This is consistent with a simple extrapolation of recent world growth rates reported by the
Food And Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, http://faostat.fao.org/site/550/
default.aspx
23In a deterministic environment, γ−1 is the coefficient of inter-temporal substitution, while in the
uncertainty case, γ is also the coefficient of relative risk aversion (CRRA).
24 International data is available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/international/contents.
25 This is available at http://www.worldenergy.org/publications/survey_of_energy_
resources_2007/default.asp. The data are estimates as of the end of 2005.
26 Information on this can be found at https://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/databases/v7/
default.asp. The GTAP 7 data base pertains to data for 2004.
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account of energy flows.
One of the first issues we need to address is that national accounts include gov-
ernment spending in GDP, which does not appear in the model.27 We therefore
subtracted government spending from the GDP measures before calibrating the re-
maining variables.28 After excluding government, the investment share of private
sector expenditure is 0.2273. Effectively defining units so that aggregate output is
1, we therefore identify 0.2273 as the sum i + n at t = 0. We would expect most of
this to be investment in capital used to produce output rather than improvements in
fossil fuel mining or energy efficiency.
Converting the GTAP data base estimates of the total capital stock to units of
GDP, we obtain the initial k(0) = 3.6071. Then if we choose units so that output
equals 1, the parameter A would equal the ratio of output to capital, that is, A ≈
0.2772. We also use the GTAP depreciation rate on capital of 4%.
From the resource constraint, the difference between total output and the sum of
the investments, namely 0.7727, would equal consumption plus the current costs gR
of supplying fossil fuel energy. We separated these two components using sectoral
data from the GTAP data base. Specifically, we classified “energy expenditure” as
combined spending on the primary fuels coal, oil and natural gas and the energy
commodity transformation sectors of refining, chemicals, electricity generation and
natural gas distribution.29 This produced a value for gR = 0.1107. Subtracting the
27 In the GTAP data base, aggregate world exports equal aggregate world imports, so world GDP
equals consumption plus investment plus government expenditure.
28 Government spending would not affect the equilibrium if it was financed by lump sum taxes
and the utility obtained from it was additively separable from the utility obtained from private
consumption.
29 A component of the investment expenditure in the energy transformation sector would, in
practice, be directed toward increasing energy efficiency and conceptually should be counted as
part of n. Like mining investments, it would reduce the cost of providing a given level of energy
services from a given input of primary fuels. However, we do not have sufficient information to split
27
initial value for gR from 0.7727 we obtain the initial value of c(0) = 0.6620. The
model solution for c(0) would follow from the first order condition λ(0) = c(0)−γ. To
obtain the calibrated value for c(0) we then need to free up an additional parameter.
We will return to this issue below.
After we set the initial values of S and N to zero, the initial value for gR would
imply
0.1107
R
= α0 +
α1
S¯ − α2/α3 . (1.49)
We can obtain a value for total fossil fuel production, R, from the EIA web site. It
gives world wide production in 2004 of 175.948 quads of oil (where one quad equals
1015 BTU), 100.141 quads of natural gas and 116.6 quads of coal . Summing these
gives a total of 392.689 quads. We then choose energy units so that the initial value
of R = 1.
To obtain an estimate of total fossil fuel resources S¯ in the same units, we begin
with the proved and estimated additional resources in place from the World En-
ergy Council. The millions of tonnes of coal, millions of barrels of oil, extra heavy
oil, natural bitumen and oil shale, and trillions of cubic feet of natural gas given in
that publication were converted to quads using conversion factors available at the
EIA. The result is 115.2 quintillion BTU, or almost 300 times the annual worldwide
production of fossil fuels in 2004. These resources are nevertheless relatively small
compared to estimates of the volume of methane hydrates that may be available.
Although experiments have been conducted to test methods of exploiting methane
hydrates, a commercially viable process is yet to be demonstrated. Partly as a result,
investment in energy transformation into a component that raises energy efficiency and a component
that simply expands existing transformation capacity. The assumption we have made is that the
vast majority of the expenditure is not aimed at increasing energy efficiency.
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resource estimates vary widely. According to the National Energy Technology Labo-
ratory (NETL), the United States Geological Survey (USGS) has estimated potential
resources of about 200,000 trillion cubic feet in the United States alone. According
to Timothy Collett of the USGS,30 current estimates of the worldwide resource in
place are about 700,000 trillion cubic feet of methane. Using the latter figure, this
would be equivalent to 719.6 quintillion BTU. Adding this to the previous total of
oil, natural gas and coal resources yields a value for S¯ = 834.8 quintillion BTU or
around 2126.0527 in terms of the energy units defined so that R = 1.
We still need to specify values for the αi parameters in the g function. Equation
(1.49) with R ≡ 1 and S¯ = 2126.0527 will give us one equation in four unknowns.
Noting that S¯−α2/α3 is the level of fossil fuel extraction S at t = 0 at which marginal
costs of extraction g(S, 0) become unbounded, we associate S¯ − α2/α3 with current
proved and connected reserves of fossil fuels.31 A recent report from Cambridge
Energy Research Associates (Jackson, 2009), for example, gives weighted average
decline rates for oil production from existing fields of around 4.5% per year. They
also note that this figure is dominated by a small number of “giant” fields and that,
“the average decline rate for fields that were actually in the decline phase was 7.5%,
but this number falls to 6.1% when the numbers are production weighted.” Hence,
we shall use 6% as a decline rate for oil fields. If we use United States production
and reserve figures as a guide, we find that natural gas decline rates are closer to 8%
per year but coal mine decline rates are closer to 6% per year. In accordance with
these figures, we assume the ratio of fossil fuel production to proved and connected
30 Abstract and slides are available at http://www.netl.doe.gov/kmd/cds/disk10/collett.
pdf
31 Current official reserves are not the relevant measure since many of these are not connected
and thus are unavailable for production without further investment, denoted n in the model.
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reserves equals the share weighted average of these figures, namely (175.948 ∗ 0.06 +
100.141 ∗ 0.08 + 116.6 ∗ 0.06)/392.689 = 0.0651. Thus, in terms of the energy units
defined so that R = 1, the initial value of S¯ − α2/α3 would equal 1/0.0651=15.361.
Using the previously calculated value for S¯, this leads to α2/α3 = 2110.538.
We can obtain two more equations by specifying the partial derivatives of g at
t = 0. Using GTAP data on capital shares by sector, we estimate that around
3.66% of annual investment occurs in the oil, natural gas, coal, electricity, and gas
distribution sectors.32 We noted above that in the GTAP data, total investment
i + n = 0.2273, implying that n(0) ≈ 0.0083 in private sector output units. We use
this as an additional target value. Thus, we choose values for α3 and the partial
derivative gS(0) of g with respect to S at t = 0, and hence α2 = α3 ∗ 2110.538, α1 =
gS(0)/0.0651
2 and α0 = g(0) − α1 ∗ 0.0651, to target c(0) and n(0). Turning next
to the learning curve (1.9), the literature provides a range of estimates for α. An
online calculator provided by NASA33 gives a range of learning percentages between
5 and 20% depending on the industry. A learning percentage of x, which corresponds
to a value of α = − ln(1 − x)/ ln(2), has the interpretation that a doubling of the
experience measure will lead to a cost reduction of x%. Thus, x = 0.2 is equivalent
to α = 0.322 while x = .05 corresponds to α = 0.074. In a study of wind turbines,
Coulomb & Neuhoff (2006) found values of α of 0.158 and 0.197. Grbler & Messner
(1998) found a value for α = .36 using data on solar panels. van Benthem et al.
(2008) report several studies finding a learning percentage of around 20% (α = 0.322)
32 Since we have defined R to be energy services input, investments in energy efficiency in addition
to mining increase the effective supply of fossil fuels. Hence, we include investments in the energy
transformation sectors. While some of these would not increase energy efficiency, some investments
in the transportation and manufacturing sectors that have not been included would be aimed at
raising energy efficiency.
33 Available at http://cost.jsc.nasa.gov/learn.html.
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Symbol Meaning Value
β time discount rate 0.05
γ coefficient of inter-temporal substitution 4
pi population growth rate 0.01
δ depreciation rate of physical capital 0.04
A total factor productivity 0.2772
fossil fuel technology
S¯ total fossil fuel resources 2126.0527
α0 fixed production cost (invariable to S and N) 0.1084
α1 cost coefficient of current proved fossil fuels 0.0354
α2 fossil fuel reserve coefficient of technology 31660.3780
α3 fossil fuel reserve coefficient of technology 15
renewable energy technology
α learning-by-doing rate 0.25
Γ1 initial stock of knowledge 26.0238
Γ2 technological limit of production cost 0.0885
ψ knowledge accumulation elasticity of learning 0.33
initial value of variables at T = 0
k0 capital per capita 3.6071
c0 consumption per capita 0.6620
n0 technological investment per capita 0.0083
S0 cumulative fossil fuel production 0
N0 technology progress on fossil fuels 0
Q0 population 1
Table 1.1 : Calibration of parameters
for solar panels. We conclude that for renewable energy technologies α could range
from a low of 0.15 to a high of 0.32, so we chose a middle value of α = 0.25.
The other parameter affecting the incentive to invest in renewable energy sources
is the initial value Γ−α1 of the cost of using renewable energy as the primary energy
source. Using a document available from the Energy Information Administration
(EIA) 34 the cost of new onshore wind capacity is about double the cost of combined
34 Assumptions to the Annual Energy Outlook, 2009, “Electricity Market Module” Table 8.2,
available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/aeo/assumption/pdf/electricity.pdf#page=3.
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cycle gas turbines (CCGT), while offshore wind is around four times as expensive,
solar thermal more than five times as expensive, and solar photovoltaic more than
six times as expensive. However, these costs do not take account of the lower average
capacity factor of intermittent sources such as wind or solar. The same document
gives a fixed O&M cost of onshore wind that is around two and a half times the
corresponding fixed O&M for CCGT, although the latter also has fuel costs. The
corresponding ratio is around 7 for offshore wind, while fixed O&M for solar photo-
voltaic are similar to the fixed O&M for CCGT. As a rough approximation, we will
assume Γ−α1 is around 4 times the initial value of g. Following the EIA, we also as-
sume that the renewable technologies can ultimately experience a five-fold reduction
in costs, so Γ2 = Γ
−α
1 /5. This would result in an energy cost that is below the current
cost of fossil fuel technologies.
Finally, we need to specify a value for ψ, the relative effectiveness of direct in-
vestment in research versus learning-by-doing in accumulating knowledge about new
energy technologies. Klaassen et al. (2005) estimated a model that allowed for both
learning-by-doing and direct R&D. Although they assume the capital cost is mul-
tiplicative in total R&D and cumulative capacity, while we assume the change in
knowledge H˙ is multiplicative in new R&D and current output, we can take their
parameter estimates as a guide. They find direct R&D is roughly twice as productive
for reducing costs as is learning-by-doing.35 Consequently, we assume that ψ = 0.33.
A list of calibration of parameters is in Table 1.1.
35 Of course, the learning-by-doing has the advantage that it directly contributes to output at the
same time it is adding to knowledge.
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1.5 Results
Next we summarize the results from the calibrated version of our model economy.
The calculations were done in MATLAB.36 The transition to a renewable energy
regime occurs after T1 = 88.41 years. Following that, renewable energy is used for
a little more than 227 years (until T2 = 315.8) before H attains its maximum value
and direct R&D expenditure j is no longer worthwhile. Output per capita grows
at an average annual rate of 4.22% in the fossil regime, 3.11% per annum (p.a.) in
the renewable regime with investment in R&D, and 4.07% p.a. in the long run with
renewable energy at its minimum cost.37
Figure 1.3 shows the behavior of the main variables in the economy during the
fossil fuel regimes. From 1.3.(e), we found the period over which n = 0 is very short,
lasting just 0.0982 years. Once investment n ceases, mining cost rises dramatically
(1.3.(f)) and the transition to renewables follows soon thereafter. Prior to its plunge
to zero, however, n rises dramatically as increasing amounts of investment are needed
to offset the effects of depletion and maintain g roughly constant. The rise in n in
turn constrains i, slowing the accumulation of k (1.3.(a) and (d)).
Figure 1.4 shows the behavior of the main variables in the renewable energy regime,
where technological progress continues to reduce renewable energy costs. After a
36 The long time horizon resulted in calculations being close to the limit of numerical accuracy.
For example, we needed to set the tolerance levels for the differential equation solvers to 5.0 ∗ 10−14.
We could not use an optimization procedure to calculate starting values and instead conducted a
grid search over values for α3 and gS(0). For each pair of values for α3 and gS(0), we adjusted
T2, k(T2) and S(T1) to match the initial values of k(0) = 3.6071, N(0) = 0 = S(0), n(0) = 0.0083
and c(0) = 0.6620. The closest we could get resulted from setting α3 = 15, gS(0) = 0.00015, T2 =
315.8, k(T2) = 141704.98998437249 and S(T1) = 1613, which yielded calculated initial values of
k(0) = 3.6644, S(0) = −0.0003179340598, N(0) = −0.07501979386, n(0) = 0.0077708 and c(0) =
0.60402. In Chapter 2, we also solved a discrete time approximation to the continuous time model
and verified that we get essentially the same transition pattern.
37 In the long run regime, per capita consumption, investment in capital, and energy use all grow
at the same average annual rate of 4.07%.
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Figure 1.3 : (a)k, (b)N , (c)pE, (d)i, (e)n, (f)g, fossil fuel regime
brief initial “burst” of investment in renewable R&D right after the transition, which
steeply cuts the cost of renewable energy, direct investment in renewable energy R&D
then drops close to zero. It subsequently gradually increases over time before plunging
toward zero again as the technological frontier for renewable energy efficiency looms.
Evidently, for much of the “middle period” of this regime, learning-by-doing is a
major source for the accumulation of technical knowledge.
Having seen the overall behavior of the model, we now look at some particular
issues in more detail. The explicit cost of mining stays fairly constant during the fossil
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Figure 1.4 : (a)k, (b)H, (c)j, (d)pE, renewable regime
fuel regime. This is due to investment in fossil fuel extraction and energy efficiency,
which allows the g function to decline even as increased exploitation, S, otherwise
raises mining costs. This process is reflected in more detail in Figure 1.5, which plots
g(S,N) as a function of S for several years. The circled points give the actual costs
as determined by the relevant value of S for each year.
Figure 1.5 shows that, apart from the terminal period where n = 0, the values
of S in each year are very near the “capacity limit” of current proved and connected
fossil fuel reserves. This is intuitive. Since there is no uncertainty in the model, it
35
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Figure 1.5 : Selected mining cost functions
would be wasteful to maintain excess reserves.
Another implication of the results graphed in Figure 1.5 is that the “cost parity
target” for renewables is a moving one. Technological change in the production
and use of fossil fuel energy sources allows them to remain competitive for longer.
Ultimately, the model implies about 80% of the technically recoverable fossil fuel
resources are exploited, with the transition occurring at the end of this century.
Although the explicit cost of mining slightly declines during most of the fossil
fuel regime, Figure 1.6.(b) shows that the shadow relative price of energy (/λ) rises
continuously. The gap is the result of the rising user cost, or scarcity rent, for fossil
fuels in terms of goods. Specifically, σ/λ becomes more negative over time up until
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Figure 1.6 : (a) consumption share of output; (b) relative price of energy
the point where investment n ceases, at which point it quickly jumps to zero.
Towards the end of the fossil fuel regime, the costs associated with fossil fuel use
and increased mining investment are large in real terms. In particular, the shadow
relative price of energy rises substantially and the consumption share of output falls
substantially around the time of transition to renewables (See Figure 1.6).38
Figure 1.7 shows the annual growth rates of per capita output and consumption.
As we would expect given concave utility, consumption growth is somewhat smoother
than output growth, but the fluctuations in consumption growth are substantial. Per
capita consumption grows by an average 3.68% in the fossil energy regime, which is
less than the average output growth. By contrast, in the renewable regime with R&D,
although R&D investment takes resources away from consumption and investment in
k, the declining cost of energy allows consumption to grow at 3.33% compared to
average annual growth in output of 3.11%.
Although Figure 1.7 shows that the per capita output growth rate rises substan-
38 The alert reader may observe that the initial consumption share in Figure 1.6.(a) is not equal
to the calibrated value. The reason is that the calculated initial value of k is about 10% too high
and the calculated value of c about 10% too low.
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Figure 1.7 : Annual growth rates of per capita output and consumption
tially for some time before the switch point, all of the additional output and more
is absorbed into producing, and investing in, fossil energy leaving fewer resources for
consumption. Right around the switch point, annual per capita output growth ac-
tually becomes negative. In summary, our model predicts an “energy crisis” around
the switch point.
The consumption share, and the growth in per capita output and consumption,
also take a long time to recover to levels attained in fossil fuel era once the renewable
regime begins. The explanation is that the cost of energy remains above the initial
cost of fossil fuels for a substantial period of time. This is apparent in Figure 1.6.(b),
which shows that the shadow relative price of energy remains more than double the
current level for over 75 years around the switch time (10 years before, 65 years after
38
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Figure 1.8 : (a) capital investment share; (b) capital and technology investment share
While the shadow price of energy is continuous, the explicit cost of mining is
below the cost of renewable energy when the transition occurs. As we explained
qualitatively above, the reason is that the learning-by-doing element of renewable
energy production has a shadow price that lowers the“full cost” of renewable energy,
making it worthwhile to transition before the explicit cost of fossil energy reaches the
initial cost of renewable energy.
The sharp fluctuations in investment in n and j noticed in Figures 1.3 and 1.4 come
at the expense of similar sharp fluctuations in investment i in k. This is illustrated
in Figures 1.8, which shows different investment shares in output. In particular,
Figure 1.8.(b) shows that the sums of investment in k and energy technologies are
much smoother than any of the investments taken alone.
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1.6 Conclusion
We studied the optimal transition path from fossil fuel to renewable energy sources in
a neoclassical growth economy. We computed the optimal path of investment in new
technology in both the fossil fuel and the renewable energy sectors and calibrated the
model using data on world energy consumption and cost data from the US.
We found that innovations in technology keep the cost of mining fairly constant
even as increased exploitation raises mining costs. Thus, renewable technologies face
a moving “parity target.” Nevertheless, learning-by-doing implies that the economy
will shift from fossil to renewable energy sources before fossil fuel costs rise to match
the cost of renewables. This arises due to the expected future returns generated by
cost reducing learning-by-doing in renewables. Ultimately, the model predicts that
the transition to renewable energy will occur at the end of this century when about
80% of the available fossil fuels will have been exploited.
For several decades before the switch point, the share of consumption in output
and the growth rate in per capita consumption both decline even though per capita
output growth increases. The reason for the gap in growth rates is that the rising
cost of energy and increased investment in fossil energy technology absorb more than
the increase in output. The shadow price of energy peaks at the end of the fossil fuel
regime and it remains more than double current levels for over 75 years around the
switch time. In addition, a large investment in mining technology is needed to offset
the effects of depletion and control energy costs toward the end of the fossil regime.
These results should carry over to any model that allows for investment in fossil fuel
technologies.
Immediately around the switch point, per capita output growth becomes nega-
tive, while the high cost of energy and the need for continuing investment in im-
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proving renewable energy technologies continue to constrain the growth in per capita
consumption and output for an extremely long time. Thus, our model predicts an
“energy crisis” around the switch point and continuing slow growth from some time
thereafter. This crisis is part of the efficient arrangement in our economy.
Our analysis can be extended in many ways. One important question concerns
robustness. Our model involves perfect substitutability between alternative energy
sources. Using a continuity argument, we can show that our results remain true if the
degree of substitutability is high, but not perfect. Introducing energy-source specific
capital could allow us to more accurately capture the trade-off between fossil versus
renewable energy production and may allow simultaneous use of different energy
sources. Studying decentralized allocations will permit us to explicitly account for
externalities associated with the investment process, such as creative destruction and
the possibility of under-investment in R&D, or environmental costs from fossil fuel
combustion. Such deviations from efficiency would also allow a possible role for policy.
We believe, however, that the key “energy crisis” aspects of our model would not be
affected by such extensions, which we leave to future research.
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Chapter 2
A Competitive Equilibrium Economy with
Technological Externalities
Abstract
In this chapter, we develop a decentralized version of the model in Chapter 1 and
allow for technological externalities. We analyze the efficiency of the competitive
equilibrium solution and discuss in particular different scenarios whereby externalities
can result in an inefficient outcome. We show that the decentralized economy with
externalities leads to under-investment in R&D, slower technological progress, and
lower investment and consumption. This may provide an opportunity for government
action to improve private sector outcomes.
2.1 Introduction
The renewable energy industry has been the recipient of substantial production subsi-
dies at the federal and state level in the past several years. In 2008, President Obama
proposed spending $150 billion over the next 10 years on renewable energy R&D. The
government subsidies on renewables was $14.67 billion in FY2010, and will be more
than $16 billion in FY2013, up from only $5 billion in 2005.
The justifications often put forward for subsidizing renewable energy are environ-
mental externalities and learning-by-doing from the production of renewable energy.
The environmental issues is not the main concern of this study, since we believe eco-
42
nomic growth and cheap energy are of first-order importance in addressing the energy
transition question. van Benthem et al. (2008) also found that for the solar energy
industry, the environmental externality is only about 10% the size of the learning-
by-doing externality, which indicated that the primary motivation for solar subsidies
depends on assumptions about learning-by-doing, rather than environmental exter-
nalities.
In Chapter 1, we have developed a dynamic general equilibrium model with
learning-by-doing effects. The model suggested that, due to the learning-by-doing
in renewable energy production, it is optimal for the transition from fossil fuels to
renewable energy to happen when the cost of fossil energy is still less than the ini-
tial cost of renewable energy. Nevertheless, since the solution was Pareto optimal
we conclude that learning-by-doing effects do not necessarily lead to sub-optimal re-
sults. Resources may naturally flow to the most profitable and socially desirable
uses without any government intervention as long as the effects have been correctly
incorporated into the price system.
In this chapter, we show that the same Pareto optimal solution could be found
in a decentralized economy. However, we also show that technological externalities
may provide some valid arguments for government action to improve private sector
outcomes. Many externalities fall into the category of technological externalities;
that is, the behavior of one firm has an impact on the consumption and production of
others, but the price of the product does not take it into account. As a result, there
are differences between private returns or costs and the returns or costs to society
as a whole. In this paper, we discuss the externalities associated with R&D and
learning-by-doing.
R&D activities are widely considered to have positive effects beyond those bene-
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fiting the company that funds the research. This is because the goal of all research is
the creation of knowledge, which is neither exhaustive in use nor perfectly excludable;
that is, individuals or firms that have devoted resources to generate new knowledge
may not be able to prevent others from making use of it. But private agents will only
bear the cost of research to the extent that they can earn private rewards. As a re-
sult, R&D will be under-provided by a market system, which will lead to sub-optimal
results.
Meanwhile, knowledge spillovers1 may arise not only when technology is created
via R&D, but also when it derives from learning-by-doing at production. In the first
chapter, we considered learning effects that depended only on the producers’ own
experience. This is usually referred to as private learning as opposed to spillover
learning, by which producers can also gain from their competitors’ experience. There
are various channels for such spillovers, such as reverse engineering, inter-firm mobility
of workers, or proximity (industry clusters).
Blasi & Requate (2007) developed a two-period model to investigate whether
learning effects justify subsidizing electricity generated from renewable resources.
The model clarified the clear distinction between pure private learning and learn-
ing spillovers. They found that for the case of purely private learning, the regulator
should only internalize the external effects of emissions by introducing an emission tax.
With learning spillovers, however, the regulator should additionally subsidize produc-
tion of wind turbines and the entry of wind-turbine producers. They concluded that
the subsidy paid to wind-power operators is too high if learning is entirely private.
Several studies showed that investments in new energy sources are likely to provide
1The two terms “technological externalities” and “knowledge spillovers” are used interchangeably
in the thesis.
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high returns for the society as a whole. Apollo Alliance suggested that a major
investment in alternative energy technologies could add more than 3.5 million new
jobs to America’s economy, stimulate $1.4 trillion in new GDP, and pay for itself
within 10 years (Apollo-Alliance 2004). Also, a 2008 University of Massachusetts
study found that a $100 billion investment in green programs would create about two
million jobs over two years (Pollin et al. 2008).
Other researchers reach more sober conclusions about the potential effects of sub-
sidies to renewable energy on economic activity and job creation. A report by the
US Senate Subcommittee on Green Jobs and the New Economy (Bond 2009) argues
that over $100,000 in green job subsidies are needed to create a job. And they found
that the wage rates at many wind and solar manufacturing facilities are below the
national average. A study on the Spanish experience finds that a e28 billion total
subsidy to renewable energy between the years 2000 and 2008 created an estimated
50,200 jobs through wind, mini-hydro and photovoltaic programs. This alone is a
subsidy of over e571,000 per job. In addition, they compared the amount of capital
the private sector employed per worker to the level of government subsidy per green
job and concluded that 2.2 jobs in the private sector have been destroyed for every
green job created (Alvarez et al. 2009).
In this chapter, we study a decentralized economy using the model developed in
Chapter 1, and allow for R&D and learning-by-doing spillovers. Competitive equi-
librium allocations in the presence of technological externalities are compared with a
Pareto optimal solution. The main results we find are:
1. Knowledge spillovers lead to sub-optimal solutions: lower investment in R&D,
slower technological progress, and lower output and consumption.
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2. With knowledge spillovers, the fossil fuel regime of the economy lasts a longer
time but with fewer fossil fuels consumed. The economy also experiences higher
energy prices during the transition period2.
3. R&D spillovers slow down the economy more than learning-by-doing spillovers.
In the next section, we describe the model setting in discrete time. Section
2.3 studies a competitive market economy and shows its equilibrium allocations are
Pareto optimal. Technological externalities are introduced in three different scenarios
in Section 2.4. Section 2.6 is the conclusion.
2.2 Social Planner Problem in Discrete Time
We use a discrete time model instead of a continuous one to study the competitive
market economy with externalities. Basically, a discrete-time model considers the
changes in the state variables between the start and the end of a time period with-
out reference to the processes in between. Since decisions are made and data are
released at discrete intervals, the discrete-time approach offers some advantages over
continuous-time models. For example, the integration of empirical variables is easier
to do in a discrete-time framework, a discrete time framework is also often better
suited to modelling a decentralized economy with many different, but interacting,
decision-makers as we assume in this chapter3. To start with, we reiterate the model
in Chapter 1 in discrete time in this section.
The fictitious social planner gives equal weights to all households that have iden-
tical tastes, and chooses allocations to maximize the objective function (2.1). The
2Strictly speaking, the transition would take place at a time point instead of a period in the
model. Here I refer to some short time periods before and after this transition point.
3An ode solver is just a discretization of the continuous differential equations
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constraints of the problem are: four state equations (2.7), (2.9), (2.8) and (2.10) with
initial conditions S0 = 0, N0 = 0, k0 > 0 and H0 = 0, the production function (2.4),
energy input (2.3), the cost of renewable energy supply (2.5), the extraction cost of
fossil fuel (2.6), and the resource constraint (2.2).4 The control variables are ct, it,
nt, jt, Rt and Bt, and the state variables are kt, St, Nt and Ht.
max
ct,kt+1,St+1,Ht+1,Nt+1
∞∑
t=0
βt
c1−γt
1− γ (2.1)
s.t. ct + it + nt + jt + g(St, Nt)Rt + qtBt = yt (2.2)
Rt +Bt = yt (2.3)
yt = Akt (2.4)
mt =

(Γ1 +Ht)
−α if Ht ≤ Γ−1/α2 − Γ1,
Γ2 otherwise
(2.5)
g(St, Nt) = α0 +
α1
S¯ − St − α2/(α3 +Nt) (2.6)
kt+1 = (1− δ)kt + it (2.7)
Nt+1 = Nt + nt (2.8)
St+1 = St +QtRt (2.9)
Ht+1 = Ht +

Bψt j
1−ψ
t if Ht ≤ Γ−1/α2 − Γ1
0 otherwise
(2.10)
Given k0, H0, N0, S0, ∀t
4Since the model is deterministic, i.e. there are no stochastic shocks or any uncertainty, the
dynamic programming cannot benefit the model-solving process much. So here I solve the problem
directly in sequence form.
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The meaning of variables and equations remains the same as the model in previous
chapter, except that the transition functions of the state variables are changed from
ordinary differential equations to difference equations of order 1. This chapter uses
the same calibrated parameter values chosen in Chapter 1, except β is adjusted to
match its new interpretaiton as a period discount factor. Using the time discount
rate 0.05 in the continuous time model, we have β = 1/(1 + 0.05) = 0.9524. The
evolution of the economy is very similar, including the four regimes as discussed in
Chapter 1. Please see a detailed analysis in the Appendix A.3.
2.3 Competitive Market Problem
In this section, we study a competitive market economy and show its equilibrium allo-
cation is also Pareto optimal. It is based on the first fundamental theorem of Welfare
Economics, which states that any competitive equilibrium allocation is Pareto opti-
mal. It provides a formal and very general confirmation of Adam Smith’s “invisible
hand” property of the market.
2.3.1 Model Assumption
The model economy has a representative (equivalently, a [0, 1] continuum of each)
household (consumer), a final good producer, a fossil energy producer, and a renew-
able energy producer. Assume that the household owns all factors of production and
all shares in firms. In each period, the household sells factor services and resource
extraction permits to firms. It also buys goods from final good producer, consumes
some of them, and accumulates the rest as capital for the next period. Assume the
firms own nothing. They simply hire capital, energy or technology on a rental basis
to produce output in each period. They sell the output, and return all profits made
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to shareholders, i.e. the household.
To form a competitive market, we will make the following assumptions. First,
we assume universal price quoting of commodities (market completeness) and price
taking by all economic agents. Second, all transactions take place in the complete
market at date 0, and what is being trade in the market is commitments to receive
or to deliver amounts of the physical good at period t = 0, 1, . . . . Finally, after this
market has closed, agents simply deliver or receive the quantities of factors and goods
they have contracted.
The convention for prices in the market is set in Table 2.1: The word“real” in
Symbol Meaning
pt the price of a unit of final good output
rt the real price of capital
wt the real price of the technology in fossil fuel sector
ft the real price of extraction permits for fossil fuel resources underground
st the real price of the accumulated knowledge in renewable energy sector
pRt the real price of energy services from fossil fuel
pBt the real price of energy services from renewable energy
Table 2.1 : The settings for prices in competitive markets
the table means all the prices are expressed in units of the final goods price in period
t. It is known that if a price p induces a competitive equilibrium, αp also induces a
competitive equilibrium for any α > 0. This allows us to normalize the prices without
loss of generality, and we usually do so by setting the price of the final good p0 at
t = 0 equal to 1.
Final Good Producer’s Problem
The final good producer rents physical capital k from the household, buys energy R or
B from energy firms, produces goods y, and sells it to the household. Given the prices
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{(pt, rt, pRt , pBt )}∞t=0, the problem faced by the representative final good producer is to
choose input demands and output supplies {(kdt , Rdt , Bdt , yt)}∞t=0 that maximize net
discounted profits. The decision problem is
maxpiF =
∞∑
t=0
pt
[
yst − rtkdt − pRt Rdt − pBt Bdt
]
(2.11)
s.t. yt ≤ Akt
yt = Rt +Bt.
Fossil Fuel Producer’s Problem
The fossil fuel producer’s problem is complicated by the fact that it is an inter-
temporal decision making process on production. According to the cost function
g(S,N) we assumed, current extraction will always increase the future costs through
the variable S. To capture this inter-temporal effect, we assume there is a market in
resource permits. At each time period t, the fossil fuel producer buys an extraction
permit for resource underground S¯−St from the household, produces energy services
Rt, and sells the permit for resource left, S¯−St+1, back to the household. Meanwhile,
the producer also rents technology stock Nt from the household and sells energy
services Rt to the final good producer.
Given the prices {(pt, wt, ft, pRt , pBt )}∞t=0, the problem faced by the fossil fuel energy
producer is to choose the demand for technology and resource, and the supply of fossil
fuel {(Ndt , Sdt , St+1, Rst )}∞t=0 that maximize net discounted profits, given initial fossil
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fuel extraction S0. Thus the problem can be written as
maxpiR =
∞∑
t=0
pt
[
pRt R
s
t − g(Sdt , Ndt )Rst − wtNdt + ftSt − ftSt+1)
]
(2.12)
s.t. St+1 = St +QtRt
Qt+1 = (1 + pi)Qt
g(St, Nt) = α0 +
α1
S¯ − St − α2α3+Nt
S0, Q0 is given.
Renewable Energy Producer’s Problem
For the renewable energy producer experiencing technological progress, the produc-
tion decision made at time t also affects the future costs due to learning by doing.
We can apply similar techniques as in the fossil fuel producer’s problem. We assume
a technology patent market for H. In this market, firms buy patents Ht for the pro-
duction of year t and sell the patents back to the household after it has risen to Ht+1
thanks to the household’s investment jt and learning-by-doing.
Given the prices {(pt, st, pRt , pBt )}∞t=0 and the initial knowledge level on renewable
energy H0, the problem faced by the renewable energy producer is to choose the de-
mand of the cumulative knowledge and the energy output supplies {(Hdt , BSt , Ht+1)}∞t=0
that maximize the net discounted profits. The problem can be written as
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maxpiB =
∞∑
t=0
pt
[
pBt B
s
t −mtBst − stHt + stHt+1)
]
(2.13)
s.t. mt =

(Γ1 +Ht)
−α, if H ≤ Γ2−1/α − Γ1,
Γ2, otherwise
Ht+1 = Ht +

Bψt j
1−ψ
t , if Ht ≤ Γ−1/α2 − Γ1,
0, otherwise.
H0 is given.
Household’s Problem
Given the full price sequence {(pt, rt, wt, st, ft, pRt , pBt )}∞t=0, the household must choose
the demand for consumption and investment, and the supplies of the current capital,
{(ct, it, nt, jt, kt+1, Nt+1, St+1, Ht+1, kst , N st , Sst , Hst )}∞t=0, given initial capital holdings
k0, initial technological progress of fossil fuel N0 and initial state of technical knowl-
edge on renewable energy H0. Note that the household’s supply of fossil fuel resources
is inelastic. It simply sells and buys permits at the amount that the fossil fuel pro-
ducer has chosen. Thus its decision problem is
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max
∞∑
t=0
βt
c1−γt
1− γ (2.14)
s.t.
∞∑
t=0
pt (ct + it + nt + jt) ≤
∞∑
t=0
pt
[
rtkt + wtNt + st(Ht −Ht+1)
+ ft(St+1 − St)
]
+ pi + piR + piB
kt+1 = (1− δ)kt + it
Nt+1 = Nt + nt
Ht+1 = Ht +

Bψt j
1−ψ
t ifHt ≤ Γ−1/α2 − Γ1,
0 otherwise.
k0, N0, and H0 is given.
Constant returns to scale technology imply no profit for the final good and the
two energy firms, that is
pi = piR = piB = 0 (2.15)
2.3.2 Definition of Competitive Equilibrium
A competitive equilibrium is a set of prices {(pt, rt, wt, st, ft, pRt , pBt )}∞t=0, an alloca-
tion
{(ct, it, nt, jt, kt+1, Nt+1, St+1, Ht+1, kst , N st , Sst , Hst )}∞t=0, for the representative house-
hold, an allocation {(yt, kdt , Rdt , Bdt )}∞t=0 for the representative final good producer, an
allocation {(Ndt , Sdt , St+1, Rst )}∞t=0 for the representative fossil fuel producer, and an
allocation {(Hdt , Bst , Ht+1)}∞t=0 for the representative renewable energy producer, such
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that, at the stated price,
1. {(yt, kdt , Rdt , Bdt )}∞t=0 solves problem (2.11);
2. {(Ndt , Sdt , St+1, Rst )}∞t=0 solves problem (2.12);
3. {(Hdt , Bst , Ht+1)}∞t=0 solves problem (2.13);
4. {(ct, it, nt, jt, kt+1, Nt+1, St+1, Ht+1, kst , N st , Sst , Hst )}∞t=0 solves problem (2.14);
5. Markets clear in all periods:
(a) Rst = R
d
t = Rt,
(b) Bst = B
d
t = Bt,
(c) kst = k
d
t = kt,
(d) N st = N
d
t = Nt,
(e) Hst = H
d
t = Ht,
(f) Sst = S
d
t = St,
(g) ct + it + nt + jt + gtRt +mtBt = yt.
Since the representative household’s preferences are strictly monotonic, the goods
prices are strictly positive for each period: pt > 0 for all t.
2.3.3 Properties of Competitive Equilibrium
To find a competitive equilibrium, we start by listing the first order conditions of the
maximization problems of different agents.
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Final Good Producer’s Problem
Because energy services from fossil fuel R and renewable energy B are perfect substi-
tutes for each other, the choice of the energy input solely depends on the energy price.
If pB > pR, fossil fuel is used; otherwise, renewable energy is used. For the following
analysis, we denote the energy input as E instead of R or B when the energy source
is unknown, and the energy price as pE for simplicity.
Because the price of goods is strictly positive in each period, the firm will supply
the market with all of the output that it produces in each period. The first constraint
of the problem (2.11) holds with equality, for all t. That is,
yt = Akt = Et. (2.16)
Substituting (2.16) into the problem (2.11), we get
maxpi =
∞∑
t=0
pt(A− pEt A− rt)kt. (2.17)
In this case, the firm has a constant marginal cost. It will supply an infinite
amount when the price is greater than the cost, any positive amount when the price
and the cost are equal, and zero amount when the price is less than the cost. The
competitive equilibrium will be where demand and supply cross, which is the price-
equal-cost case
rt = (1− pEt )A. (2.18)
Since the capital price rt cannot be negative, p
E
t has to be less than 1.
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Fossil Fuel Energy Producer’s Problem
We now consider the fossil fuel producer’s problem (2.12). When pRt < p
B
t , fossil fuel
energy is in production, Rt > 0. The first-order conditions are
∂Rt : p
R
t = g(St, Nt) + ftQt (2.19)
∂St+1 :
pt
pt+1
=
ft+1 − ∂gt+1∂St+1Rt+1
ft
(2.20)
∂Nt : wt = − ∂g
∂N
Rt (2.21)
Renewable Energy Producer’s Problem
When Ht ≤ Γ−1/α2 − Γ1, the first-order conditions for the representative renewable
energy producer are
∂Bt : p
B
t = (Γ1 +Ht)
−α − ψstBψ−1t j1−ψt (2.22)
∂Ht+1 :
pt
pt+1
=
st+1 − α(Γ1 +Ht+1)−α−1Bt+1
st
(2.23)
Once H reaches the technological frontier, we have Ht+1 − Ht = 0 and mt = Γ2.
Therefore, the first-order condition reduces to
pBt = Γ2 (2.24)
Household’s problem
Next we move on to the representative household. Because we have consumption
ct > 0 and capital investment it > 0 for all t, we have first-order conditions that ct
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and kt+1 must satisfy:
∂ct : β
tc−γt − λpt = 0 (2.25)
∂kt+1 :
pt
pt+1
= rt+1 + 1− δ, (2.26)
where λ is the multiplier associated with the budget constraint of the problem (2.14).
Taking the ratio of equation (2.25) at t and t+ 1, we have an equation for the inter-
temporal price ratio:
c−γt
βc−γt+1
=
pt
pt+1
. (2.27)
When nt > 0, a first order condition with respect to Nt+1 is available:
∂Nt+1 :
pt
pt+1
= wt+1 + 1. (2.28)
When renewable energy is in use and jt > 0, we have a first order condition with
respect to jt:
∂jt : pt(1− ψ)stBψt j−ψt − pt = 0. (2.29)
From equation (2.29), we could deduce the patent price of knowledge on renewable
energy:
st =
jψt
(1− ψ)Bψt
. (2.30)
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2.3.4 The Evolution of the Economy
In this section, we argue that the economy will evolve through various regimes of
energy use and energy technology investment. By setting the parameters, we assume
initially all energy services are provided by the lower cost fossil fuels.
Fossil Fuel Regime: pR < pB, E = R
In this regime, the renewable energy producer is uncompetitive and out of the econ-
omy, Bt = 0. Also, the technological investment n > 0 due to strictly positive
marginal products. Therefore, problem (2.11), (2.12) and (2.14) are solved simultane-
ously with the market clearing constraints. For the prices and quantities to constitute
a competitive equilibrium that must satisfy the first order conditions (2.18) - (2.20)
and (2.25) - (2.28).
Substituting (2.19)into (2.18), we have a formula of capital price rt
rt = [1− g(St, Nt)− ftQt]A. (2.31)
Substituting factor prices (2.31) and (2.21) into equation (2.26) and (2.28), and com-
bining the result with (2.27), we obtain the two Euler equations:
c−γt
βc−γt+1
= (1− gt+1 + ft+1Qt+1)A+ 1− δ (2.32)
c−γt
βc−γt+1
= 1− ∂gt+1
∂Nt+1
Akt+1. (2.33)
The dynamic system of this regime is defined by the state equations (2.7), (2.8),
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(2.9), (2.20), the Euler equations (2.32), (2.33) and the budget constraint
ct + it + nt + g(St, Nt)Rt = yt. (2.34)
Comparing with the aligned regime in the social planner problem in Appendix A.3,
we deduce that the price of the permit to extract fossil fuel ft is equal to the real
shadow price of fossil fuel energy.
ft = −σt/λt. (2.35)
Given equation (2.35), we can see that the difference equation system that describe
the competitive equilibrium is exactly the same as the one that solves social planner
problem. Hence it would give us Pareto optimal solutions.
Denote the transition date from fossil fuel to renewable energy as T1. At T1,
fossil fuel is no longer used. Hence we have ft = 0. Also, investment on fossil fuel
technology ceases and wt = 0. There might be a period right before T1 in which n = 0.
During this period, Nt+1 = Nt, the first order condition (2.21) and (2.28) no longer
hold and equation (2.33) cannot be used. Instead, this regime could be defined by
(2.7), (2.8), (2.9), (2.20), (2.32) and the budget constraint (2.34) with n = 0. Again,
we obtain the same equations as apply in the social planner problem (See Appendix
A.3).
At transition point T1, we have p
R = pB, fT1 = 0 and HT1 = 0. Substituting
(2.19) and (2.22) into this price equality, we have an equation that is only true at T1:
gt(St, Nt) = Γ
−α
1 + ψstB
ψ−1
t j
1−ψ
t . (2.36)
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Once gt grows large enough and meets the condition of transition (2.36), fossil fuels
will no longer be used and the economy will be powered by renewable energy from
that point onward.
Renewable Regime: pR > pB, E = B
Renewable energy is in use when pRt > p
B
t , while fossil fuel energy is obsolete due to
its high cost. Hence we have E = B. In this regime, the renewable energy producer
is in production and the R&D investment j > 0 due to strictly positive marginal
products. Therefore, problem (2.11), (2.13), and (2.14) are solved simultaneously
with the market clearing constraints. For the prices and quantities to constitute a
competitive equilibrium, they must satisfy first order conditions (2.18), (2.22) - (2.23),
(2.25) - (2.27), and (2.29).
First, we can deduce a relationship between the physical capital price rt and the
energy price pBt from equation (2.18) and (2.22):
rt = (1− pBt )A =
(
1− (Γ1 +Ht)−α + ψstBψ−1t j1−ψt
)
A. (2.37)
Substituting (2.16) and (2.30) into (2.37), and then to (2.26), we would have:
c−γt
βc−γt+1
= A− (Γ1 +Ht+1)−αA+ 1− δ + ψjt+1
(1− ψ)kt+1 . (2.38)
At the same time, (2.16), (2.23) and (2.30) give us another equation needed to solve
the system,
c−γ
βc−γt+1
= Aψkψj−ψ
[
(1− ψ)αAkt+1(Γ1 +Ht+1)−α−1 + A−ψk−ψt+1jψt+1
]
. (2.39)
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The dynamic evolution of this renewable regime could be fully described by a differ-
ence equation system with the state equations (2.7), (2.10), (2.23), the Euler equations
(2.38), (2.39), and the budget constraint
ct + it + jt +mtBt = yt. (2.40)
Obviously, equation (2.38) and (2.39) are the same as equations (40) and (41) in the
social planner problem (as shown in Appendix A.3), respectively. Then we again
obtain the same equation system as that of the social planner problem. Hence the
competitive equilibrium solutions are Pareto optimal as well.
Note that the patent price of the cumulative knowledge st is equal to the real
shadow price of Ht in the social planner problem:
st =
ηt
λt
=
jψt
(1− ψ)Bψt
. (2.41)
Before renewable technology reaches its technological frontier Γ
−1/α
2 − Γ1, due to the
strictly positive marginal product of Ht, st is always positive. Therefore, from equa-
tion (2.41) above, we know R&D investment j would keep positive until technological
frontier is reached.
Once technological progress in the renewable sector reaches its upper limit, the
production cost mt equals a constant Γ2. Ht no longer exists in the firm and house-
hold’s problems. In this case, equation (2.18), (2.26), and (2.24) apply. Combining
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with the first order condition (2.27), we have the equation
c−γt
βc−γt+1
= (1− Γ2)A+ 1− δ = A¯. (2.42)
Equation (2.42) above, the state equation (2.7) and the budget constraint
ct + it + Γ2Bt = yt (2.43)
together define the long-run regime without any technological progress. Solving the
difference equation system analytically, we have the limiting policy function of state
variable kt
kt+1 = (βA¯)
1/γkt. (2.44)
And the long-run economic growth rate will be (βA¯)1/γ − 1.
2.3.5 Numerical Solutions of Competitive Equilibrium
Following the calibration in section 1.4, in this section, we will solve the competitive
market model numerically.5 The transition to the renewable energy regime occurs
after T1 = 98 years. Following that, renewable energy is used for 268 years (until
T2 = 366) before H attains its maximum value and direct R&D expenditure j is no
longer worthwhile. Output per capita grows at an average annual rate of 2.94% in the
fossil regime, 2.92% per annum (p.a.) in the renewable regime with R&D investment,
5Comparing to the initial target value k(0) = 3.6071, N(0) = 0 = S(0), n(0) = 0.0083 and c(0) =
0.6620, the closest calculated initial values of k0 = 3.6070, N0 = 9.2457e− 05, S0 = 20.4151, n(0) =
0.0066 and c(0) = 0.6189.
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and 3.67% p.a. in the long-run with renewable energy at its minimum cost.6
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Figure 2.1 : Pareto optimal results: (a)k, (b)c, (c)i, (d)p, [0, T2]
Figure 2.1 shows the behavior of the main variables in the economy for 366 years
before entering the final analytical regime. From Figure 2.1(a) - (c), we could see
capital k, investment i and consumption c rise quickly and span 5 orders of magnitude.
Figure 2.1(d) shows the real price of the good decreases as consumption c grows.
Variables in Figure (2.1) are also shown in the semi-log plot in Figure 2.2 so that
6 In the long run, per capita consumption, investment, and energy use all grow at the same
average annual rate of 3.67%, calculated by equation (2.44).
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Figure 2.2 : (a)k, (b)c, (c)i, (d)p in semilog form, [0, T2]
changes for small values could be captured. In Figure 2.2, we can see some interesting
changes during the transition period: The investment growth slows down and then
has a spike ( 2.2(a)). Capital growth follows the same trend as investment growth
in a mild way( 2.2(b)). On the other hand, the consumption growth rate slows
down ( 2.2(c)) and the goods price decreases slower as well ( 2.2(d)). This is mainly
because investment in fossil fuel technology n increases sharply during this period and
constrains i and c. Also, the high energy price keeps the good price from decreasing.
Figure 2.3 shows the energy price and shares of output. In 2.3(a), we observe
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, [0, T2]
that the energy price starts low and keeps flat for some decades, then it increases
mainly due to the growing price of the extraction permit ft and population growth
Qt . It peaks at year 94 with a price that is nearly 6 times the starting value and then
drops because the permit price decreases to zero. At the transition time T1 = 98,
the price is the extraction cost gT1 , which is around 4 times the starting price. The
energy price keeps decreasing in the renewable regime. At T2, the energy price is Γ2,
which is slightly lower than the starting price by calibration. Figure 2.3(b)-(c) are the
consumption share and the investment share of the output, respectively. We see that
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Figure 2.4 : Pareto optimal results:(a)S, (b)N , (c)g, (d)n, fossil fuel regime
the consumption share falls down during the transition while the investment share
peaks.
We then turn to the fossil fuel regime to study the transition of variables when
T1 is approaching. In Figure 2.4, (a) is the cumulative production of fossil fuel.
At the transition date, about 75% of the fossil fuel resource underground has been
extracted. (d) shows the investment in fossil fuel technologies. It remains low for
about 50 years. Then due to resource depletion, the marginal production cost tends
to rise as long as the difficulty of extraction increases. In order to maintain the cost
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Figure 2.5 : Pareto optimal results: (a)m, (b)j, renewable energy regime
at a reasonable level, n rises very fast until close to the transition. The period n = 0
is very short, lasting only 0.05 year7. Once the investment n ceases, the mining cost
rises dramatically ( 2.4(c)) and the transition to renewables follows soon thereafter.
In the renewable energy regime, the marginal production cost m and the R&D
investment j are shown in Figure 2.5. A brief initial burst of investment in the renew-
able R&D right after the transition steeply cuts the energy production cost. Then
R&D investment in renewable energy drops close to zero. It subsequently gradually
increases over time before plunging toward zero again as the technological frontier
for renewable energy efficiency is approached. Evidently, for much of the “middle
period” of this regime, learning-by-doing is a major source of the accumulation of
technical knowledge.
7Because n = 0 period is shorter than a year, in order to investigate the dynamics of n, I solve a
corresponding differential equation system in [T1 − 1, T1]
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2.4 Technological Externalities
In this section, we will study technological externalities, which imply the welfare the-
orems will not hold. An externality is present whenever the well-being of a consumer
or the production possibilities of a firm are directly affected by the actions of another
agent in the economy and those effects are not reflected in market prices (Mas-Colell
et al. 1995). By assumption the households do not incorporate the utility associated
with it into their consumption, saving, and production decision. As a result, there
are differences between private returns or costs and the returns or costs to the society
as a whole, and the competitive equilibrium allocation is no longer efficient.
In contrast with the standard competitive model, we assume that technological
progress in renewable energy has knowledge spillovers. Also, knowledge spillovers
may arise not only when technology is created via R&D investment, but also when it
derives from learning by doing at production. Let B¯t and j¯t stand for the aggregate
levels of B and j, respectively. That is, we assume each renewable energy producer’s
knowledge accumulation not only comes from its own R&D investment and experience
at production, but also from the aggregate actions taken by all producers. The
knowledge accumulation as a function of the renewable technology changes to:
Ht+1 = Ht +

(B¯θt j¯
ρ
t )B
ψ−θ
t j
1−ψ−ρ
t if Ht ≤ Γ−1/α2 −Γ1,
0 otherwise.
(2.45)
where θ is the spillover weight of learning-by-doing, and ρ measures the extent of
R&D externalities. With θ = ρ = 0, The function is the same as the case with no
externality. With θ = ψ and ρ = 1−ψ, there are 100% learning and R&D spillovers,
and the knowledge accumulation only depend on the cumulative production of all
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producers and the aggregate level of R&D in the industry. Using equation (2.45)
instead of (2.10), the Euler equations of the renewable regime (2.38) and (2.39) change
to
c−γt
βc−γt+1
= A− (Γ1 +Ht+1)−αA+ 1− δ + (ψ − θ)jt+1
(1− ψ − ρ)kt+1 (2.46)
c−γ
βc−γt+1
= Aψkψj−ψ
[
(1− ψ − ρ)αAkt+1(Γ1 +Ht+1)−α−1 + A−ψk−ψt+1jψt+1
]
(2.47)
We study three different scenarios: ρ = 0.05ψ, θ = 0.95ψ, ρ = 0.25ψ, θ = 0.75ψ;
and ρ = 0.95ψ, θ = 0.05ψ. In the first scenario, we have small R&D spillovers and
large learning-by-doing spillovers. In the second scenario, R&D spillovers increase a
little but are still not comparable to learning spillovers. We expect the effects of the
learning spillover to be larger, so we assume a larger θ in the first two scenarios. The
last scenario is a contrasting case with large R&D externalities and small learning
spillovers. Results are reported in detail in the next section.
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2.5 Knowledge Spillover Scenarios
In this section, we compare the three externality scenarios with the Pareto optimal
solution in section 2.3.5. As shown in Table 2.2, we denote the four scenarios including
Pareto optimal one as case A, B, C, and D, respectively.
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Figure 2.6 : Scenarios:(a)k, (b)c, (c)i, (d)n, fossil fuel regime
Figure 2.6 and 2.7 show some of the main variables of all four scenarios in the fossil
fuel regime. Both figures and Table 2.2 show that in case A, the economy transits
to the renewable regime earliest, while it takes longer for cases B, C, and D to reach
the transition. We find that the four scenarios are similar in the first 50 years or so
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Case A B C D
ρ = 0, ρ = 0.05ψ, ρ = 0.25ψ, ρ = 0.95ψ,
Variables θ = 0 θ = 0.95ψ θ = 0.75ψ θ = 0.95ψ
T2 366 387 400 436
T1 98 103 106 112
ST1 1595 1582 1579 1570
Table 2.2 : Transition dates and extracted fossil fuel resources at T1
and then diverge. In Figure 2.6, the black line (case A) lies above all three cases B,
C and D and shows the highest k, c, i, and n. Unlike the Pareto optimal case A, in
cases B, C, and D, consumptions decline substantially in the later fossil fuel period
(2.6(b)). Investments also suffer some decrease and slow the accumulation of capital
before technological investment n ceases(2.6(a) and (c)).
Case A exploits the most fossil fuel resources at the transition date, while case
D exploits the least, even through it remains in the fossil regime for the longest
time. This is because we assume E = Ak all the time without any energy efficiency
improvement. Hence higher output and consumption require higher energy input.
Figure 2.7(c) is the marginal extraction cost g, which stays almost constant during
most of the fossil fuel regime and then rises dramatically when investment in mining
technology stops. The pattern of the four cases is comparable to Figure 1.5 in Chapter
1, and again shows the “moving parity target” feature of the model. 2.7(b) is the
extraction permit price ft. It rises as long as the resource is depleting and becomes
more expensive. It drops to zero at T1 when fossil fuel extraction becomes uneconomic.
Summing up the production cost and the total price of extraction permits, we can get
the fossil fuel price shown in 2.7(d). We find that the prices are higher in cases with
externalities, and case D with the heavy R&D spillovers suffers the highest prices.
Figure 2.8 and 2.9 show the main variables in the renewable regime. Note that
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Figure 2.7 : Scenarios: (a)S, (b)f , (c)g (d)pR, fossil fuel regime
the origin of the coordinates on x axis is the transition point T1 instead of T = 0.
First of all, we see economies with externalities reach the technological frontier later
(Also see Table 2.2). The reason is that sub-optimal investments ( 2.8(c) and (d))
slow down the technological progress.
In Figure 2.9, we observe that case A has the lowest goods price and energy price
(2.9(a) and (b)). Cumulative knowledge H reaches to its upper limit sooner because
of higher investment( 2.9(c)). Figure 2.9(d) shows the learning-by-doing contribution
to energy prices. At the transition point, case A has the highest learning-by-doing
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Figure 2.8 : Scenarios: (a)k, (b)c, (c)i, (d)j, renewable energy regime
effect and the lowest initial renewable energy price. That’s why case A transits sooner
than the other three cases.
According to comparisons across these four cases above, R&D spillovers (case D)
appear to lead to the most severe under-investment problem and retard the economy
the most. It is probably because in this case, the household has a very low motivation
to invest in R&D and looks forward to taking benefits from other firms as a “free-
rider”.
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Figure 2.9 : Scenarios: (a)p, (b)PB, (c)H, (d)m− pB, renewable energy regime
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2.6 Conclusion
Although both the social planner solution and the competitive equilibrium solution
gave similar evolution trends of the economy, the substantially different allocations
between the two highlight the important role played by the technological externalities
in economic growth.
In this chapter, we have developed a decentralized version of the model in Chap-
ter 1. This decentralized model allows for technological externalities. We have ana-
lyzed the efficiency of the competitive equilibrium solution and discussed in particu-
lar different scenarios in which externalities can result in an inefficient outcome. We
have showen that the decentralized economy with externalities will lead to under-
investment in R&D, slower technological progress, and lower investment and con-
sumption. This may potentially allow the government to take better actions to im-
prove the private sector outcomes.
75
Chapter 3
Local Employment Impacts of Competing Energy
Sources: the Case of Shale Gas Production and
Wind Generation in Texas
Abstract
In this study, we develop a general econometric model to compare job creation in wind
power versus that in the shale gas sector. The model is “general” in the sense that
different restrictions to parameters of the model yield a range of special cases, such
as finite distributed lag, autoregressive distributed lag, and spatial panel approaches.
We also compare the results using the different special models and discuss some of
their advantages and drawbacks. The model is estimated using county level data in
Texas from 2001 to 2011. Despite different estimation methodologies, the results show
that shale development and well drilling activity have brought strong employment and
wage growth to Texas, while the impact of wind industry development on employment
and wages statewide is either not statistically significant or quite small.
3.1 Introduction
Nowadays, there is a lot of discussion in the media about job creation in the renewable
energy industry. At the same time, commentators have talked up about the poten-
tial for renewable energy to provide greater energy independence and security, have
notable environmental benefits due to reduced CO2 emissions, and act as a driver for
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significant economic growth by fostering continual innovation.
Since energy produced through renewable sources is still more expensive that
that produced through fossil fuels, state and local governments are spending tens of
millions of dollars is subsidies to fund the renewable industry. More than half of
all states have put in place Renewable Portfolio Standards1 to promote generation
from renewable sources. Federal production tax credits and grants also contributed
to increases in renewable capacity and generation between 2001 and 2011.
The renewable energy sector has developed quickly in the past 12 years. In partic-
ular, as seen in Figure 3.1, wind was the fastest growing source of non-hydroelectric
renewable resource generation, as many operators of wind turbines have benefited
from tax credit programs. Other sources of non-hydroelectric renewable electricity
generation have included biomass, geothermal, and wood, but these have remained
relatively stable since 2000.
In principle, renewable energy has the potential to create many jobs. Furthermore,
many of these jobs are guaranteed to stay domestics, as they involve construction and
installation of physical plant and facilities. Additionally, domestic wind turbine and
component manufacturing capacity has increased. Eight of the ten wind turbine
manufacturers with the largest share of the U.S. market in 2011 had one or more
manufacturing facilities in the United States at the end of 2011. By contrast, in 2004
there was only one active utility-scale wind turbine manufacturer assembling nacelles
in the United States (GE)2. In addition, a number of new wind turbine and component
manufacturing facilities were either announced or opened in 2011, by both foreign and
1 Renewable portfolio standards (RPS), also referred to as renewable electricity standards (RES),
are policies designed to increase generation of electricity from renewable resources. These policies
require or encourage electricity producers within a given jurisdiction to supply a certain minimum
share of their electricity from designated renewable resources.
2 2011 Wind Technology Market Report by U.S. Department of Energy
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Figure 3.1 : Non hydro-power renewable energy generation, 1990-2011 Data source:
EIA
domestic firms. The American Wind Energy Association (AWEA) estimates that the
entire wind energy sector directly and indirectly employed 75,000 full-time workers
in the United States at the end of 2011.
At the same time, the recent identification of the vast extent of shale gas and oil
reserves and the development of cost-effective horizontal drilling and hydraulic frac-
turing techniques has caused U.S. production of shale oil and gas to boom. The En-
ergy Information Administration’s 2012 Annual Energy Outlook (EIA 2012) projects
that the share of shale gas as a part of total U.S. natural gas production will increase
from 4 percent in 2005 to 34 percent by 2015 and 49 percent by 2025. As shown
in Figure 3.2, shale gas is the largest contributor to natural gas production growth;
there is relatively little change in production levels from tight formations, coalbed
methane deposits, and offshore fields.
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Figure 3.2 : Natural gas production by source, 1990-2035 (TCF). Data source: EIA
The development of shale gas resources has created an investment boom in the
oil and gas industry and led to economic revitalization in places like North Dakota,
Alberta, West Pennsylvania, Texas, and Louisiana to name a few. During 2007-2011,
employment in the oil and gas extraction sector grew at an annual rate of 7.49 percent
and 33.5 percent in total. By comparison, during the same period, total employment
declined 3.3 percent below the starting value (Figure 3.3a). Meanwhile, states rich
in shale gas have experienced a large increase in employment while the nationwide
employment growth rate remains negative (Figure 3.3b). Furthermore, the substan-
tially expanded U.S. natural gas supply at stable, relative low prices is stimulating
downstream investment in natural gas using equipment by numerous manufacturing
sectors3, as well as electricity generators (Figure 3.4), and the transportation sector.
This activity is creating jobs and increasing wage income.
Both the wind power sector and shale gas sector have been developing quickly and
3 Especially manufacturing sectors that are sensitive to energy costs, such as basic chemicals,
plastics & rubber, pharmaceuticals, aluminum, pesticides, paints, and fertilizers.
79
(a) (b)
Figure 3.3 : Oil and gas extraction employment, 2007-2011
receiving significant attention in the media. Since wind and natural gas are competing
sources of electricity generation, in order to guide policy, it would be useful to have
an idea of how many jobs are created by these two competing resources. While
the aggregate net effect on employment from exploiting different sources of energy
production is clearly an important question, it cannot be readily answered in the
context of traditional macroeconomic models. The reason is that, as these models
assume market clearing, they cannot easily account for variations in unemployment
rates and thus are not well suited to study the consequences of alternative government
policies for aggregate employment levels. Regardless of how one models the operation
of labor markets, however, the impact of any change can be gauged by examining the
labor intensity of the different activities.
Generally speaking, two types of studies focus on the employment impacts in the
energy industry. One is an input-output (I/O) model, the other is based on survey
responses from employers, and uses simple descriptive and analytical techniques4. In
this study, we collected data on the historical job creation per unit of energy services
4 See Section 3.2 for detailed discussion.
80
Figure 3.4 : Electricity net summer capacity by source (all sectors), 1949-2011, Data
source: EIA
produced for each energy source and used this data and a simple econometric model to
estimate the historical job-creating performance of wind versus that of shale gas. It is
a bottom-up approach, like the approach based on surveys. However, the econometric
techniques used allow us to compare the employment impacts of these two different
sectors in a more systematic and consistent way.
The next section is the literature review, and section 3.3 is the data description.
The general econometric model is introduced in section 3.4, while estimation methods
and results are reported in section 3.5. Section 3.6 is the conclusion.
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3.2 Literature Review
There has been a large increase in reports on shale jobs and wind jobs in the past
several years. Most previous analyses have been completed by non-government or-
ganizations, consulting firms, or universities but there have been few peer-reviewed
journal publications.
Generally speaking, there are two types of studies that focus on the employment
impacts in the energy industry. One is an input-output(I/O) model, which is intended
to model the entire economy as an interaction of goods and services between vari-
ous industrial sectors and consumers. The other is based on survey responses from
employers, and uses simple descriptive and analytical techniques.
For oil & gas industry, most reports are I/O model studies. Two widely-used
I/O models are the IMPLAN model (See IHS (2012), UTSA (2012), Considine et al.
(2009), and American-Chemistry-Council (2011)) and the RIMS II model by U.S.
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) (See Scott&Associates (2009)). 5 All the studies
we have investigated suggest shale oil and gas boom has a large impact on jobs, income
and economic growth.
A study on Eagle Ford Shale (UTSA 2012) estimates the total economic output
impact of shale activity on local 14-county region in 2011 was just under $20 billion
dollars and supported 38,000 full-time jobs. If the studied region was extended to
20-county region, 47,097 full-time jobs were supported instead.
A nationwide shale industry report(IHS 2012) has found that in 2010, the shale
gas industry supported 600,000 jobs, and this will grow to nearly 870,000 in 2015 and
5The IMPLAN model uses a national input-output dollar flow table called the Social Accounting
Matrix (SAM) to model the way a dollar injected into one sector is spent and re-spent in other
sectors of the economy, and measure its economic multiplier effects. The RIMS II provides solely
I/O multipliers that measure output, employment, and earnings effects of any changes in a regions
industrial activity.
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to over 1.6 million by 2035.
Two reports on Marcellus shale by Pennsylvania State University (Considine et al.
2009) and West Virginia University (Higginbotham et al. 2009) show that the oil and
gas industry in Pennsylvania generates $3.8 billion in value added, and over 48,000
jobs in 2009; while in west Virginia, the economic impact of the oil and natural gas
industry in 2009 is $3.1 billion in total value added and approximately 24,400 jobs
created.
The Jobs and Economic Development Impact(JEDI) model developed by the Na-
tional Renewable Energy Laboratory(NREL) is a series of spreadsheet-based I/O
models that estimate the economic impacts of constructing and operating power
plants, fuel production facilities, and other projects at the local (usually state) level.6
Slattery et al. (2009) employs the JEDI Wind Energy Model to examine economic
impacts of the large-scale wind farm construction and tested the model validation us-
ing data from NextEra’s Capricorn Ridge and Horse Hollow facilities. They find that
the JEDI model overestimates local share of jobs in construction phase in smaller,
rural county, and underestimates number of jobs (more than 50%) in large, urban
county. Obviously, JEDI model sets same local share value to all counties and does
not consider urban effects as well. Plus, JEDI model assumes 100% local share for
operations and maintenance (O&M) jobs, which may be implausible especially in
small rural counties.
I/O models provide the most complete picture of the economy as a whole. They
capture employment multiplier effects, as well as the macroeconomic impacts of shifts
between sectors. Hence they could account for losses in one sector (e.g. conventional
oil industry) created by the growth of another sector (e.g. the wind energy industry).
6JEDI Models are available at http://www.nrel.gov/analysis/jedi/.
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However, collecting data for an I/O model is highly labor intensive, and the calibration
process of default multiplier parameters may be biased due to lack of information and
subjectivity.
On the other hand, bottom up estimates are based on industry/ utility surveys, the
outlook of project developers and equipment manufacturers, and primary employment
data from companies across manufacturing, construction, installation, and O&M.
For wind energy, most reports are analytical-based studies, and only calculate direct
employment impacts.
A case study7 on economic effects of Gulf wind project in Texas reports that they
would create 250 - 300 jobs during peak construction period (9 months), and 15 - 20
permanent jobs.
A report on wind industry from Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) mea-
sures number of direct jobs that a typical wind farm may create across the entire value
chain. They analyzed each of the 14 key value chain activities independently to de-
termine the number of workers involved at each step in the wind farm building. And
they found that just one typical wind farm of 250MW would create 1079 jobs over
the lifetime of the project.
Similarly, the Renewable Energy Policy Project (REPP) has developed a spreadsheet-
based format of the calculator8 using data based on a survey of current industry prac-
tices. It is used to calculate the number of direct jobs from wind, solar photovoltaic,
biomass and geothermal sectors as a result of enactment of an RPS. According to
the calculator, every 100 MW of wind power installed provides 475 jobs in total (313
manufacturing jobs, 67 installation jobs, and 95 jobs in O&M).
7Slides is available at Gulf Wind: Harnessing the Wind for South Texas
8More information is available at http://www.repp.org/labor/
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3.3 Data
In this paper, we use data from Texas, because it contains rich shale gas and oil
resources while also being the national leader in wind installations and a manufac-
turing hub for the wind energy industry. According to EIA, Texas accounted for 40
percent of U.S. marketed dry shale gas production in 2011, making it the leading
unconventional gas producer among the states. Meanwhile, Texas leads the nation in
wind-powered generation capacity and is the first state to reach 10,000 megawatts of
wind capacity.
3.3.1 Data Description
In Texas, there are 254 counties9. For each county i = 1, ..., 254, We have observations
in T = 132 months of 11 years (2001 - 2011), making the panel balanced.
I took total employment in all industries as a dependent variable. I did not
use data of specific energy industries because, besides direct job creation, I want to
consider the total employment effects, including indirect jobs, such as jobs created
in upstream and infrastructure supplying industries, and induced jobs, such as jobs
added in sectors supplying consumer items (food, auto, and housing, etc.) and ser-
vices. Another candidate dependent variable is the average weekly wage, since it may
also be impacted by an increase in the demand for workers. We use monthly em-
ployment data and quarterly wage data from Quarterly Census of Employment and
Wages (QCEW) Database of Bureau of Labor Statistics(BLS).10 The latter has been
9 77 of 254 are urban counties.
10 QCEW employment and wage data are derived from microdata summaries of 9.1 million em-
ployer reports of employment and wages submitted by states to the BLS in 2011. These reports
are based on place of employment rather than place of residence. Average weekly wage values are
calculated by dividing quarterly total wages by the average of the three monthly employment levels
(all employees, as described above) and dividing the result by 13, for the 13 weeks in the quarter.
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adjusted to a real wage using the implicit price deflator (IPD) of GDP from BEA. 11
In order to evaluate the impact of shale and wind industry development on em-
ployment and the local economy, we need to devise a method for measuring the
activity of the shale and wind industries. The key explanatory variables we use are
the number of unconventional wells completed and the new installed wind capacity
in each county each month.
Other variables could be used to reflect other aspects of shale activity. These
include the number of permits, rig counts, the number of wells spudded, and shale
gas production. We choose the number of wells completed because the completion
date indicates the end of the construction period of each well. During the construction
period, more direct and on-site jobs are created; after the construction, on-site jobs
decrease while indirect and induced effects would last. To fully describe the impact
of shale on employment, especially the multiplier effects of job creation in the local
economy, we allow well drilling activities to affect employment with a lag and study
both pre-completion and post-construction effects.
In the shale industry, the entire process from spudding to producing marketed
output can take up to 3-4 months, among which horizontal drilling currently takes
approximately 18-25 days from start to finish. Then wells are fractured to release the
gas before the well is completed. It is then connected to a pipeline, which transports
the gas to the market. Among all these steps, hydraulic fracturing is most labor
intensive and the last step before the completion. Hence we expect drilling activities
to have a peak impact on employment in the pre-completion period in the month of
well completion.
The employment and wage data could be downloaded at http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/dsrv?en
11 An implicit price deflator of GDP is the ratio of the current-dollar value of GDP, to its corre-
sponding chained-dollar value, multiplied by 100.
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Figure 3.5 : Number of completed new wells, Jan, 2001 - Dec, 2011
The well information is taken from the Drilling Info Database12. We choose wells
that are both directional/horizontal drilled and hydraulically fractured13, so that
we exclude conventional oil/gas wells from our data set. There were 31050 direc-
tional/horizontal and fractured wells completed in 174 counties of Texas during 2001
- 2011, including 25467 gas wells, 4963 oil wells, and 620 other types of wells. From
Figure 3.6, we can see that shale gas developed very quickly in the past 12 years,
from 1 well per month in Jan, 2001 to around 500 in 2011. The completion date and
location of each well are used to count the number of wells completed in each county
each month.
12 Data is available at http://info.drillinginfo.com/
13 This filter option is only available for Texas data
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To measure wind activity in each county we used installed nameplate capacity
online per month. Power generation data is not used because more jobs are created
during the construction period than in the O&M period. The installed capacity and
online year of all wind projects in Texas through 2007-2011 can be found at American
Wind Energy Association (AWEA). For the wind projects before 2007, I used EIA
electricity data on plant level output14 and a wind industry progress report by Wind
Today. To find the online month and county location of each wind project, I referred
to some additional sources, such as project information from projects’ websites and
local news of its online year. For those wind farms that cover several neighboring
counties, I divided installed capacity of farms equally between each of the counties.
Until 2011, 125 wind projects had been constructed in 40 counties, with total installed
capacity of 10006MW, compared to 6 counties and 920MW in 2001.
3.3.2 Data Stationarity
Since regression test statistics do not have the usual asymptotic distributions when
variables are non-stationary, we want to look at the stationarity of the variables before
we use them in any regression analyses. To test for non-stationarity in a panel data
setting, we consider the following model written in difference form:
∆yit = ρyi,t−1 +
pi∑
L=1
δi∆yi,t−L + α0 + α1t+ uit, t = 1, 2, ... (3.1)
and test ρ = 0. Note that the term α0 +α1t allows for a constant and a deterministic
time trend. When ρ = 1, the series yit has unit root and is a random walk. The
random walk process is simply a sum of all past random shocks, which means that
14Data is available at EIA website.
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Figure 3.6 : New wind capacity installed during Jan, 2001 - Dec, 2011
the effect of any one shock lasts forever. When ρ < 1, yt is stationary
15 and as the
variables get farther apart in time, the correlation between them becomes smaller and
smaller.
The Im, Pesaran and Shin (IPS) test (Im et al. 2003) we used to test for ρ = 0
is based on the estimation of above augmented Dickey-Fuller(ADF) regressions for
each time series. A statistic is then computed using the t-statistic associated with
the lagged variable. Note that this procedure does not require ρ to be the same for
all the counties. The null hypothesis is that all the series have unit root, and the
alternative is that some may have a unit root while others have different values of
15 Specifically, yt is covariance stationary, which means the correlation between yt and yt+h only
depends on h.
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ρi < 0.
To run the test, one has to determine the optimal number of lags pi for each time
series in the panel. With too few lags, uit will be serially correlated and the test
statistics will not have the assumed distribution. With too many lags the power of
the test statistic goes down. Since we have monthly data, I set maximum pi at 14,
which is slightly larger than 12 month annual cycle. Then I used both the Swartz
information criteria (SIC) and Akaike information criteria (AIC) to determine optimal
pi.
We then used another test based on Hadri (2000) as a complement. The Hadri
statistic does not rely on the ADF regression. It is the cross-sectional average of the
individual KPSS statistics (Kwiatkowski et al. 1992), standardized by their asymp-
totic mean and standard deviation. It tests the opposite null hypothesis that all
panels are stationary, while the alternative is that some panels contain unit roots.
For both the employment and the wage series, the p-value of the IPS test is close
to zero. Hence H0 is rejected and we conclude that some counties may have no
unit roots. On the other hand, the Hadri test rejects H0 as well, implying that at
least one county has a unit root. Hence, we may conclude from the two tests that
the employment and wage series of some counties have unit roots while others are
stationary.
Given these inconclusive results, I then applied the Dickey-Fuller Generalized
Least Squares (DF-GLS) test (at 5% level) and the KPSS test (at 10% level) to each
county. In 156 counties, the DF-GLS test cannot reject a unit root and the KPSS
test shows unit root.
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3.4 Econometric Model
We estimated the original regression relationship treating the data via a panel data
approach given data set of 254 counties in Texas covering the years 2001-2011. Panel
data has several advantages relative to either time series or cross section data. For
one, it allows us to look at dynamic relationships which we cannot do with a single
cross section. A panel data set also allows us to test for effects in counties with shale
and wind activities and those without, which cannot be done with a time series alone.
A major problem with straight time series analyses is that many exogenous factors
change at the same time making it difficult to assign an outcome to any one particular
change. The panel enables us to interpret differences between counties over time as
policies vary in both dimensions.
We did a panel data approach given a data set of 254 counties in Texas during
2001-2011. Comparing to time series and cross section data, having data over time
for the same counties is useful for several reasons. For one, it allows us to look at
dynamic relationships which we cannot do with a single cross section. A panel data
set also allows us to control for unobserved cross section heterogeneity.
3.4.1 Assumptions
We start with a static linear unobserved effects model
yit = xitβ + θt + ci + uit, t = 1, 2, ..., T, (3.2)
where yit is a scalar, xit is a 1×K vector for t = 1, 2, ..., T , and β is a K×1 vector. ci
is a time-invariant unobservable effect, and θt represents a series of time fixed effects.
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Logarithmic functional form
First of all, we assume the dependent variables appear in logarithmic form. Recall
that in linear form, we suppose constant level increase in dependent variable, which
may not be reasonable in this case. The logarithmic form implies that the percentage
increase in employment or wage is the same by additional well drilled or 1 MW wind
capacity built, i.e. an increasing return as independent variables increase. The log-
level functional form is quite common in applications when dealing with employment
and wage data.
Dependence of unobservable effects
To make the assumption more realistic, we allow for arbitrary dependence between
the unobserved effects ci and the observed explanatory variables xit. For example,
underground geology characteristics would be included in ci and these would un-
doubtedly be correlated with number of wells drilled in county i. Also, wind capacity
highly depends on the climate and especially the wind resource of the county, which
is part of ci as well.
Strict Exogeneity
Another assumption I would like to make is that the explanatory variables are strictly
exogenous conditional on the unobserved effect ci. This terminology, introduced by
Chamberlain (1982), requires that
E(uit|xi, ci) = 0, t = 1, 2, ..., T. (3.3)
That is to say, once xit and ci are controlled for, xis has no partial effect on yit
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for s 6= t and uit has zero mean conditional on all explanatory variables in all time
periods.
Contemporaneous exogeneity is a much weaker assumption: E(uit|xit, ci) = 0.
Note that it says nothing about the relationship between xs and ut for s 6= t. Sequen-
tial exogeneity, which requires E(uit|xit,xi,t−1, ...,xi1, ci) = 0, for t = 1, 2, . . . , T , is
stronger than contemporaneous exogeneity. It implies that xs is uncorrelated with ut
for all s ≤ t, but puts no constraints on correlation between xs and ut for s > t.
Typically, we feel comfortable with assuming zero contemporaneous correlation,
that is, uit is uncorrelated with the number of wells drilled or the wind capacity in-
stalled at t, but what about correlation between uit and, say, xi,t+1? Does future well
drilling activity or wind farm construction depend on shocks to the county employ-
ment in the past? We don’t think such feedback is very important in our case, since
total employment of the county is certainly not the main goal of energy companies.
So it seems reasonable to assume that past employment has few, if any, effect on
energy companies’ future decision making processes.
Another issue is that the explanatory variables could have lasting effects, so that
correlation exists between uit and past xi,t−1, ...xi,1 and sequential exogeneity fails.
It is likely to be the case here since we expect well drilling activity and wind activity
to have lasting effects on local employment. One way to soak up correlation is to
include lags of explanatory variables into the model. Strict exogeneity would still
hold if enough lags are included. The other way is to use instrumental variables (IV).
However, the IV method is usually not recommended because it is often difficult to
find suitable instruments.
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Serial Correlation
Note that we haven’t made any assumption to rule out serial correlation in the idiosyn-
cratic error uit, that is Corr(uit, uis) 6= 0, t 6= s. Specifically, here we only consider
serial correlation across time, assuming cross-sectional correlation is excluded a priori.
If one allows for the uit to be arbitrarily serially correlated over time, the usual pooled
ordinary least squares (OLS) and fixed effects (FE) standard errors are not valid, even
asymptotically. A robust standard error should be used to calculate test statistics or a
more general kind of feasible general least squares (FGLS) method is needed. To test
existence of serial correlation in uit, we use the Breusch-Godfrey/Wooldridge’s LM
test and the Wooldridge first difference test (Wooldridge 2002) for serial correlation
in panel models.
Rather than see serial correlation as a technical violation of an OLS assumption,
the modern view is to think of time series data in the context of economic dynamics.
Instead of mechanistically fixing serial correlation with a robust covariance matrix
and FGLS method, we could also try to develop theories and use specifications that
capture the dynamic processes in question. From this perspective, we view serial
correlation as a potential sign of improper theoretical specification rather than a
technical violation of an OLS assumption. This view of serial correlation leads us to
look at dynamic regression models where “ dynamic” refers to the inclusion of lagged
variables.
There are two types of dynamic models: (i) distributed lag models and (ii) au-
toregressive models. Distributed lag models include lagged values of the independent
variables, whereas autoregressive models include lagged values of the dependent vari-
able.
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3.4.2 Finite Distributed Lag Model
Since we expect drilling and wind activity could have lasting effects on local em-
ployment, we should include lags of explanatory variables into the model. A finite
distributed lag (FDL) model might be appropriate if the impact of the explanatory
variables lasts over a finite number of periods q and then stops. The FDL unobserved
effects model expands equation (3.2) to the form:
Eit =
q∑
k=0
βkwellsi,t−k +
q∑
k=0
δkwcapi,t−k + ci + θt + uit (3.4)
where Eit denotes total employment in logarithmic form, wellsit denotes number
of directional/fractured wells drilled, and wcapit is installed wind capacity for i =
1, 2, . . . , 254 and t = 1, 2, . . . , T . Our interest lies in pattern of coefficients {βk, δk}qk=0.
β0 and δ0 are the immediate change in Ei due to the one-unit increase in wellsi and
wcapi respectively at time t. Similarly, βk and δk are the changes in Ei k periods
after the temporary change. At time t + q, Ei has reverted back to its initial level:
Ei,t+q = Ei,t−1.
We are also interested in the change in Ei due to a permanent increase in any of
the explanatory variables. For example, following a permanent increase in wellsit,
after one period, Ei,t+1 has increased by β0 + β1, and after k periods, Ei,t+k has
increased by β0 + . . . + βk. There are no further changes in Ei after q periods. This
shows the sum of the coefficients on current and lagged wellsi is the long-run change
in Ei, which is also referred to as the long-run propensity (LRP). For the impact of
variable wcapi on Ei, the same story applies.
However, it is rarely the case that we actually know the right lag length or have
a strong enough theory to inform us about it. Some other problems may also arise
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with an FDL model. For example, time series are often short and so the inclusion of
the lagged variables may eat up a lot of degrees of freedom. In addition, the fact that
the explanatory variables are likely to be highly correlated is likely to lead to severe
multicollinearity.
3.4.3 Autoregressive Distributed Lag Model
We can solve the multicollinearity problem mentioned above by including a lagged
dependent variable with fewer lags of explanatory variables, and the model changes
to the autoregressive distributed lag (ADL) model. In many ways, the ADL model is
similar to the FDL model, except it is now easy to see that the impact of explanatory
variables persists over time but at a geometrically declining rate. Denoting the num-
ber of lagged dependent variables as p, an ADL(p, q) model with unobserved effects
has the form:
Eit =
p∑
j=1
λjEi,t−j +
q∑
k=0
βkwellsi,t−k +
q∑
k=0
δkwcapi,t−k + ci + θt + uit (3.5)
where {λj}pj=1 are autoregressive coefficients. If there is a temporary change in wells,
Eit will initially go up by β0 in period 1, then by β1 + λ1β0 in period 2, and then by
β2 +λ1(β1 +λ1β0)+λ2β0 in period 3 etc. In other words, the effect of having a lagged
dependent variable is to make the effect from the previous period persist. Eventually,
the effect of the impulse will disappear and we will return to our original equilibrium
as long as the process is stationary. If we have a unit level change, the ADL model
reaches a new equilibrium that is
∑q
k=0 βk
1−∑pj=0 λj (3.6)
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higher than the original equilibrium.
Another advantage of the ADL model is that the inclusion of a lagged dependent
variable will often eliminate the serial correlation, particualrly if additional lags of
the dependent variable are included. Lags of the independent variables may also
assist with eliminating serial correlation in the error term. Hence, once we start
putting any lagged values of yit into explanatory variables, dynamic completeness
is an intended assumption, which clearly implies sequential exogeneity. However,
the strict exogeneity assumption is necessarily false as we discussed before. In this
case, both the fixed effects (FE) estimator and the first difference (FD) estimator are
inconsistent.
Making decision which model to use and how many lags to include is complicated
by the fact that we are unlikely to have enough theory to distinguish between the
different models. As a result, Boef & Keele (2008), along with many others, argue
that you should start with a general model like the ADL and test down to a more
specific model, including the optimal values for p and q.
3.4.4 Spatial Panel Models
In this section, we discuss cross-sectional dependence (XSD) in panels. This can arise,
for example, if spatial diffusion processes are present, relating panel members (in our
case counties) in a way that depends on a measure of distance. The Pesaran CD test
and CD(p) test (Pesaran 2004) are used to detect XSD. These tests are all based on
the averages over the time dimension of pairwise correlation coefficients for each pair
of cross-sectional units, while the CD(p) test takes into account an appropriate subset
of neighboring cross-sectional units to check the null of no XSD against dependence
between neighbors only. To do so, a spatial weights matrix W is needed for the CD(p)
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test.
In our data set, both tests show the presence of XSD at 0.000 level. This is not
surprising, since it seems likely that employment might be correlated across counties.
Therefore, we use a spatial panel model to study this spatial interaction effect across
counties and try to capture the indirect effect of a county’s energy sector development
on employment within other counties. Spatial interaction effects could be due to
competition or complementarity between counties, spillovers, externalities, regional
correlations in industry structures and many other factors.
Interactions between spatial units are typically modeled in terms of some measure
of distance between them, which is described by a spatial weights matrix W . W is
a 254 × 254 non-negative matrix, in which the element wij expresses the degree of
spatial proximity between the pair of objects i and j. Following Kapoor et al. (2007),
the diagonal elements wii are all set to zero to exclude self-neighbors. Furthermore,
only neighborhood effects are considered in this paper, that is, W is a contiguity
matrix16:
wij =

1, if i and j are neighbors
0, otherwise.
(3.7)
Then the contiguity matrix is transformed into row- standardized form, which assumes
the impact on each unit by all other neighboring units are equal. Given a spatial
weights matrix W , a family of related spatial econometric models can be expanded
16W is also called as adjacency matrix.
98
from equation (3.2):
Eit = ρ
N∑
j=1
wijEjt + β1wellsit + β2wcapit + uit, (3.8)
where ρ is the spatial autoregressive coefficient. The composite error uit can be
specified in two ways. For the first case, uit = ci+ it, while it is a vector that follows
a spatial autoregressive process of the form
it = λ
N∑
j=1
wijjt + νit (3.9)
with λ being the spatial autocorrelation parameter.
A second specification for the error uit is considered in Kapoor et al. (2007).
They assume that spatial correlation applies to both unobserved individual effects
and the remainder error components. In this case, uit follows a first order spatial
autoregressive process of the form:
uit = λ
N∑
j=1
wijujt + it (3.10)
and  follows an error component structure
it = ci + νit (3.11)
to further allow it to be correlated over time. Although the two data generating
processes look similar, they do imply different spatial spillover mechanisms governed
by a different structure of the implied variance covariance matrix. In this paper, I
consider the implementation of the second error term specification, which leads to a
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simpler variance matrix that is also easier to invert.
A spatial panel model may also contain a spatially lagged dependent variable
(ρ 6= 0), known as a spatial autoregressive (SAR) model. Alternatively, there also
could be a spatial autoregressive process in the error term (λ 6= 0), in which case the
model is known as a spatial error model (SEM).
The spatial lag model posits that the dependent variable depends on the dependent
variable observed in neighboring units and on a set of observed local characteristics.
The spatial error model, on the other hand, posits that the dependent variable de-
pends on a set of observed local characteristics and that the error terms are correlated
across the space.
3.5 Estimation Methods and Results
Let us first turn to the general unobserved effect model (3.2). The pooled OLS es-
timator can be used to obtain a consistent estimator of β only if the explanatory
variables satisfy contemporaneous exogeneity and zero correlation with ci. In section
3.4.1, we assumed that contemporaneous exogeneity holds. However, as we discussed
in section 3.4.1, explanatory variables are necessarily correlated with unobserved in-
dividual effects ci. In addition, F tests of poolability show pooled OLS estimation is
inconsistent. Hence, the pooled OLS estimator should not be used.
Since random effects analysis also requires orthogonality between ci and observed
explanatory variables, as well as strict exogeneity, it is also inconsistent and inap-
propriate to be used. The result of the Hausman test, namely χ2 = 262.0484 with a
p-value close to zero, again indicates that the random effects approach is inconsistent.
With a fixed effects (FE) or first difference (FD) approach, the explanatory vari-
ables are allowed to be arbitrarily correlated with ci, but strict exogeneity of them
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conditional on ci is still required. The idea behind the fixed effects approach is to
transform the equations by removing the inter-temporal mean and thereby eliminat-
ing the unobserved effect ci. One can then apply pooled OLS to get FE estimators.
Similarly, the FD approach transforms the equations by lagging the model one period
and subtracting, then applying pooled OLS to get FD estimators.
As we mentioned in section 3.3.2, we found that more than half of counties have
highly persistent employment series. Using time series with a unit root process in a
regression equation could be very misleading and cause a spurious regression problem.
In that case, first differencing should be used to remove any potential unit roots in
Eit and explanatory variables, so spurious regression is no longer an issue.
3.5.1 Estimation of FDL model
Since FD approach requires strict exogeneity, we need test it first. Note that the
strict exogeneity assumption never holds in unobserved effects models with lagged
dependent variables. The reason is that yit is correlated with uit and would show up
as part of explanatory variables at t+1 so E(uit|xx+1) 6= 0. Therefore, in this section
we drop all lagged dependent variables and use the FDL approach, equation (3.4).
Without including any lagged dependent variables, We made the strict exogeneity
assumption in 3.4.1. In addition, Wooldridge (2002), 10.7.1 provides a test of strict
exogeneity. It is based on the equation
∆yit = ∆xitβ + witγ + ∆uit, t = 2, ..., T, (3.12)
wi,t is a subset of xi,t. Under strict exogeneity, none of xit should be significant
as additional explanatory variables in the first difference (FD) equation, that is, we
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should find H0: γ = 0. Carrying out this test, the F statistic on γ is 0.32 with
p− value = 0.5695, and we could not reject H0, strict exogeneity holds.
First Difference Estimator
To get the FD estimator, we lagged the model (3.4) one period and subtracted to
obtain:
∆Eit =
q∑
k=0
βk∆wellsi,t−k +
q∑
k=0
δk∆wcapi,t−k + θ0 + θt + ∆uit, t = 2, 3, ..., T, (3.13)
Note that rather than drop an overall intercept and include the differenced time
dummies ∆θt, we estimated an intercept and then included time dummies θt for T −2
of the remaining periods. Because these sets of regressors involving the time dummies
are nonsingular linear transformations of each other, the estimated coefficients on the
other variables do not change.
To determine the appropriate lag length q, I posited a maintained value that
should be larger than optimal q. Here I use 24. Then I did sequential F tests on the
last 24 > p coefficients, stopping when the test rejects the H0 that the coefficients
are jointly zero at 5% level. Following the F statistics, I drop 18 lagged explanatory
variables and assign q = 6.
Next we need test for the presence of serial correlation in ∆uit, I use Breusch-
Godfrey test and Wooldridge’s test for serial correlation in panels. Both tests accept
H0
17 and we cannot reject that no serial correlation remains in the idiosyncratic
errors. Then we could perform OLS and obtain the FD estimator.
The estimation results are reported in Table 3.1 with standard errors. From the
17p− value = 0.3656 and p− value = 0.3096, respectively
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Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.)
wellsit 2.371e-04 9.41e-05
∗∗
wellsi,t−1 1.802e-04 1.163e-04
wellsi,t−2 1.649e-04 1.227e-04
wellsi,t−3 1.423e-04 1.246e-04
wellsi,t−4 1.056e-04 1.244e-04
wellsi,t−5 1.115e-04 1.2e-04
wellsi,t−6 1.574e-04 9.92e-05∗
wcapit -1.87e-05 2.15e-05
wcapi,t−1 -6.8451e-05 2.88e-05
wcapi,t−2 -5.4210e-05 3.25e-05
wcapi,t−3 -1.66e-05 3.35e-05
wcapi,t−4 3.65e-06 3.25e-05
wcapi,t−5 -1.55e-05 2.88e-05
wcapi,t−6 -2.77e-05 2.15e-05
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05
Table 3.1 : FD Estimation Results, q = 6
table, we find six of seven coefficients of the wind installed capacity are negative
and all are insignificant. Hence the impact of wind activity on employment is not
significant from zero.
On the other hand, we find wellst, wellst−1,... and wellst−6 to be jointly sig-
nificant. The coefficient of wells at T = 0 are significant at 0.01 level, and the
contemporaneous effects of wells on employment is 0.032%. It means that for each
additional well drilled, employment will increase 0.032% in that month. Then the
impact remains significant at 0.05 level when T = 6. After six months, the impact of
well drilling fades and the employment falls back to the original level. We graph the
estimated short run impact of wellsk and wcapk as a function of k in Figure 3.7. The
lag distribution summarizes the dynamic effects that a temporary increase in explana-
tory variables has on the dependent variable. From Figure 3.7(a), we see a generally
decline trend on the impact of wells as time passes, which is expected because workers
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leave after the well completion. The employment growth rate increases starting at
month 4. It is probably because the emerging of new business opportunities in the
neighborhood due to the well drilling activity. Figure 3.7(b) shows the impact of new
wind capacity added. It may show some useful trending information even though the
results is hardly significant. We see the growth rate decline first and then increase
more. The largest positive impact happens about four months after the wind farm
construction and then it declines again.
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Figure 3.7 : FD estimation results with q = 6: (a) wells (b) wind capacity
Note that we have a really low R2 = 0.00084, which measures the amount of
variation in employment that is explained by wells. Since oil and gas related employ-
ment is only 2.6% of the total employment in Texas, a low explanatory power of the
regression model is to be expected.
3.5.2 Estimation of ADL model
In this section, we include lag dependent variables into the model. Since the ADL
model contains lagged dependent variables, as we discussed in section 3.4.3, the strict
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exogeneity assumption is violated, and neither FE nor FD estimators are consistent.
In this case, the generalized method of moments (GMM) is used.
Generalized method of moments estimator
Following Arellano & Bond (1991), we applied two-way GMM method to estimate
the ADL model, shown in equation (3.5). We again need to assign appropriate p and
q to the model before we estimate it. As before, we start with large enough p and q
that they are guaranteed to be larger than their optimal value: p = q = 24.
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.)
Ei,t−1 0.8914825 0.0057468∗∗∗
Ei,t−2 0.0062052 0.0055876
wellsit 0.0004499 0.0001068
∗∗∗
wellsi,t−1 0.0001178 0.0001046
wellsi,t−2 0.0000916 0.0001029
wellsi,t−3 0.000056 0.0001037
wellsi,t−4 0.0000539 0.0001041
wellsi,t−5 0.0001362 0.0001082
wellsi,t−6 0.0002677 0.0001132∗
wcapit -9.00e-06 0.0000248
wcapi,t−1 -0.0000184 0.0000243
wcapi,t−2 0.0000239 0.0000237
wcapi,t−3 0.0000107 0.0000236
wcapi,t−4 0.0000242 0.0000237
wcapi,t−5 -0.0000129 0.0000243
wcapi,t−6 -9.63e-06 0.0000249
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05
Table 3.2 : GMM Estimation Results, p = 2, q = 6
First, When we include two lagged dependent variables Ei,t−1 and Ei,t−2, the
Wooldridge’s test for serial correlation reports χ2 = 0.0333 with p− value = 0.8551.
Hence we can conclude that the error uit is then serially uncorrelated. In this case, we
say the model is dynamically complete since enough lags have been included so that
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further lags of dependent and independent variables do not matter for explaining Eit.
Hence we set p = 2.
As in previous section I then set q = 6 and estimated the two way Arellano-Bond
GMM regression. The results are in Table 3.2. Note that both the Wald test and
the joint F test cannot reject the coefficients of wind capacity δ0 = . . . = δ6 = 0
in model, which implies no impact of wind activity on local employment. In the
following discussion we therefore focus solely on the wells variable.
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Figure 3.8 : GMM estimation results with p = 2, q = 6: (a) wells (b) wind capacity
The coefficients on the wells variable lags then reveal information about the short-
run response of employment: Eit initially go up by β0 in period 1, then by β1 + λ1β0
in period 2, and then by β2 + λ1(β1 + λ1β0) + λ2β0 in period 3, etc. It takes about
25 months for the impacts to decrease to zero. Comparing to FDL model, effects
from the previous period tend to persist in the ADL model. Figure 3.8 graphs the
resulting dynamic response of employment to a unit increase in wellsit and wcapit.
From Figure 3.8(a), we find the impact of well peaks at 6th month after completion,
which is complement to the FD estimation results (See Figure 3.7(a)).
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Note that from the results, the sum of the two estimated coefficients of the lagged
dependent variables is 0.98, which is close to 1. Although the test λ1 + λ2 = 1 is
rejected at 1% level, we may still be concerned that employment is a unit root process.
Recall that in section 3.3.2, we checked data stationarity and found employment
in some counties has unit root although some also do not. If the dependent and
independent variables are non-stationary, there might be a concern that the regression
results are spurious.
To test this question, I ran the same estimation using data only for the 98 counties
that have stationary employment series and obtained similar estimates: λˆ1+λˆ2 = 0.98.
Hence in our case, large λs doesn’t necessarily mean that the dependent variable
follows a unit root process. We believe that the large persistence of employment is
probably due to the small explanatory power of well drilling on employment, which
is reasonable since employment in shale gas sector is a rather small component of the
total employment.
3.5.3 Estimation of Spatial Panel Models
Recall that in 3.4.4 we discussed the theory behind the spatial autoregression (SAR)
and spatial error model (SEM). In the SAR model, the inclusion of the dependent
variable on the right hand side of the above equation introduces simultaneity bias and
the OLS estimator is no longer unbiased and consistent, while in the SEM, the OLS
estimator is unbiased, but inefficient. Therefore, maximum likelihood estimation is
used to estimate the parameters of both models.
Both the SAR and SEM models are estimated allowing for two-way fixed effects.
The results are reported in Table 3.3. Following LeSage & Pace (2009), the expecta-
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SAR Coefficients:
Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(> |t|)
ρ 0.3070 7.4715e-03 41.0854 < 2e− 16∗∗∗
wells 2.1567e-03 1.3034e-04 16.5461 < 2e− 16∗∗∗
newcap -2.9295e-05 6.3850e-05 -0.4588 0.6464
SEM Coefficients:
λ 0.3041 7.5100e-03 40.4857 < 2e− 16∗∗∗
wells 1.9255e-03 1.4138e-04 13.6195 < 2e− 16∗∗∗
newcap -2.6024e-05 6.3814e-05 -0.4078 0.6834
Signif. codes: 0 *** 0.001 ** 0.01 * 0.05 . 0.1 1
Table 3.3 : Spatial interaction effects on employment
tion of the SAR model y = ρWy +Xβ +  is
E(y) = (IN − ρW )−1Xβ (3.14)
We thus find that employment in county i depends on developments in neighboring
counties as workers in bordering counties migrate to take advantage of new job op-
portunities due to shale and wind activity. This provides a motivation for the spatial
lag variable Wy.
The own- and cross-partial derivatives for the SAR model take the form of an
N ×N matrix that can be expressed as:
∂y/∂x′r = (IN − ρW )−1INβr (3.15)
These partial derivatives show how drilling/wind activities in county j influence
employment in county i. For the rth explanatory variable, the average of the main
diagonal elements of this matrix is labelled as the direct effect, and the average of
cumulative off-diagonal elements over all observations corresponds to the indirect
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effect. The average total effect will be the sum of the two.
This model implies that direct effect of well drilling activity on employment is
0.0022, and it is significant at the 0.000 level. The direct effect measures how wells
drilled in a particular county affect employment in that same county. The result
shows that about 0.22% jobs would be created by drilling a well in the same county.
Also, the indirect effect estimate of well drilling activity is 9.1433e-4, which makes
the total effect grow to 0.0031. The direct and indirect effects of wind activity are not
statistically significant as we found from the time series models. Hence, wind farm
installation and construction has not been found to have any impact on employment.
3.5.4 Estimation Results on Wage
We also looked for impacts of shale gas and wind developments on weekly wages
instead of employment. Like the employment regression results, the FD approach has
been used. The results show that neither coefficients of wells nor wind capacity are
jointly significant, although the impact of wells is about 3 times larger.
The spatial panel regression results for wages are shown in Table 3.4 The spatial
coefficients ρ and λ are all very significant and show large spillover effects. The
coefficients of wells β1 and of wind β2 are significant at < 0.1 level. Using formula
(3.15), the direct and indirect effect of well drilling activity on wage are 3.4625e-04
and 1.2978e-04, respectively, and they are significant at 0.01 level. From the result,
we could say the total effect on wage is 0.0476% per well drilled, of which 0.0346%
is due to drilling activity in the same county, and 0.013% is attributed to drilling
activity in the neighbors. The effects of the wind activity on wage is smaller than
that of shale activity but still statistically significant at 0.1 level. The total effect is
0.0146% per MW, with about 0.01066% of direct effect and 0.004% of indirect effect.
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SAR Coefficients:
Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(> |t|)
ρ 0.2844 7.6068e-03 37.3851 < 2e− 16∗∗∗
wells 3.4028e-04 1.1328e-04 3.0038 0.002666∗∗
newcap 1.0478e-04 5.5565e-05 1.8856 0.059342.
SEM Coefficients:
λ 0.2843 7.6083e-03 37.3622 < 2e− 16∗∗∗
wells 2.7937e-04 1.2230e-04 2.2843 0.02235∗
newcap 1.1063e-04 5.5492e-05 1.9937 0.04619∗
Signif. codes: 0 *** 0.001 ** 0.01 * 0.05 . 0.1 1
Table 3.4 : Spatial interaction effects on wage
3.6 Conclusions
In this study, we develop a general econometric model to compare job creation in
wind power versus that in the shale gas sector. We have discussed the advantages and
disadvantages of a number of different models. We then estimated them using county
level data in Texas from 2001 to 2011. Despite different estimation methodologies,
the results were quite consistent and show that shale development and well drilling
activity have brought strong employment and wage growth to Texas, while the impact
of wind industry development on employment and wage statewide is quite small and
not statistically significant.
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.1 Partial derivatives of g(S,N)
The fist partial derivatives are given by
∂g
∂S
=
α1(α3 +N)
2
[(S¯ − S)(α3 +N)− α2]2 > 0 (16)
and
∂g
∂N
= − α1α2
[(S¯ − S)(α3 +N)− α2]2 < 0 (17)
so that increases in S increase marginal cost, while improved technology reduces the
costs of providing fossil fuel energy. The second order partial derivatives with respect
to S and N are given by
∂2g
∂S2
=
2α1(α3 +N)
3
[(S¯ − S)(α3 +N)− α2]3 > 0 (18)
and
∂2g
∂N2
=
2α1α2(S¯ − S)
[(S¯ − S)(α3 +N)− α2]3 > 0 (19)
In particular, this function implies that cumulative exploitation S increases fossil fuel
energy cost at an increasing rate, while investment in fossil fuel technology decreases
costs at a decreasing rate. In fact, we can conclude from (17) that ∂g/∂N → 0 as
N → ∞. The latter fact should imply that eventually it becomes uneconomic to
invest further in reducing the costs of fossil fuel energy. Thus, fossil fuel resources
will likely be abandoned long before all known deposits are exhausted as rising costs
make renewable energy technologies more attractive.
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Finally, the cross second partial derivative will be given by
∂2g
∂N∂S
= − 2α1α2(α3 +N)
[(S¯ − S)(α3 +N)− α2]3 < 0 (20)
Hence, investment in fossil fuel technology delays the increase in costs of fossil fuel
energy accompanying increased exploitation.
.2 The Numerical Solution Procedure
In the numerical analysis, we can solve the model moving either backwards or forwards
through time, but in practice we found it easier to solve backwards. In the backwards
solution, we know the values of the co-state variables at the various transition points.
The known initial values S(0) = N(0) = 0, k(0) = k0 > 0 of the state variables at
t = 0 become targets. We have three free variables to set in order to hit these three
target values.
Specifically, if we guess values for the transition time T2 and the value of the
capital stock at that time k(T2), the values of the constant K¯ and hence λ(T2) are also
determined. We also know that at T2 we must have η(T2) = 0 and p = (Γ1 +H)
−α =
Γ2, which will determine the value of H at T2, namely H = Γ
−1/α
2 −Γ1. The differential
equations (1.31), (1.33), (1.34) and (1.35) are then solved backward until T1, when
H = 0. The values of k and λ at T1 then provide initial conditions for the differential
equations (1.43) and (1.47) in the fossil fuel regime. Using (1.32) and (1.36), the
fact that σ(T1) = 0, and the requirement that the shadow price of energy has to be
continuous across the region boundaries we conclude that
Γ−α1 −
η
λ
=

λ
= g(S,N) (21)
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For the values of η(T1) and λ(T1) obtained from the backward solution in the renew-
able regime, and the exogenously specified Γ−α1 , (21) would then determine the value
of the mining cost g(S(T1), N(T1)) at T1. Thus, N(T1) will be determined once we
guess the value of S(T1). Finally, the requirements that σ(T1) = 0 = ν(T1) will pro-
vide the remaining initial conditions for the five differential equations (1.22), (1.43),
(1.44), (1.46) and (1.47). The initial fossil fuel regime with n > 0 then starts at T0
when ν = λ. For all t ≤ T0, we then have k, S,N, σ and λ given by the solutions to
the differential equations (1.43)–(1.47).
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.3 The Social Planner Problem in Discrete Time
Denote the corresponding co-state variables for difference equations (2.7) - (2.10) by
q, σ, ν and η. Let λ be the Lagrange multiplier on the resource constraint and  on
the energy constraint. We also need to allow for the possibility that either type of
energy source is not used and investment in cost reduction for the energy technology
is zero. To that end, let µ the multiplier on the constraint j ≥ 0, ω the multiplier on
the constraint n ≥ 0, ξ the multiplier on the constraint R ≥ 0 and ζ the multiplier
on the constraint B ≥ 0.
Assuming technology progress in renewable sector ends at T2, the Lagrangian is
defined by
L =
T2−1∑
t=0
βt
{
c1−γt
1− γ + λt[Akt − ct − it − jt − nt − g(St, Nt)Rt − (Γ1 +Ht)
−αBt]
+t(Rt +Bt − Akt) + µtjt + ωtnt + ξtRt + ζtBt + qt[it + (1− δ)kt − kt+1]
+ηt(Ht +B
ψ
t j
1−ψ
t −Ht+1) + σt(St +QtRt − St+1) + νt(Nt + nt −Nt+1)
}
+
∞∑
t=T2
βt
{
c1−γt
1− γ + lambdat[Akt − ct − it − Γ2Bt] + t(Bt − Akt) + qt[it + (1− δ)
kt − kt+1] + ηt(Ht −Ht+1) + σt(St − St+1) + νt(Nt −Nt+1)
}
.
(22)
When T ≤ T2, The first order conditions for a maximum with respect to the
control variables are:
∂L
∂c
= c−γt − λt = 0 (23)
∂L
∂i
= qt − λt = 0 (24)
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∂L
∂j
= (1− ψ)ηtBψt j−ψt − λt + µt = 0;µtjt = 0, µt ≥ 0, jt ≥ 0 (25)
∂L
∂n
= −λt + νt + ωt = 0, ωtnt = 0, ωt ≥ 0, nt ≥ 0 (26)
∂L
∂R
= −λtg(St, Nt) + t + σtQt + ξt = 0, ξtRt = 0, ξt ≥ 0, Rt ≥ 0 (27)
∂L
∂B
= t + ψηB
ψ−1
t j
1−ψ
t − λt(Γ1 +Ht)−α + ζt = 0, ζtBt = 0, ζt ≥ 0, Bt ≥ 0. (28)
The first order conditions for a maximum with respect to the next period state
variables are:
∂L
∂kt+1
= Aλt+1 − At+1 + (1− δ)qt+1 − qt
β
= 0 (29)
∂L
∂Ht+1
= λt+1α(Γ1 +Ht+1)
−α−1Bt+1 + ηt+1 − ηt
β
= 0 (30)
∂L
∂St+1
= −λt+1Rt+1 ∂gt+1
∂St+1
+ σt+1 − σt
β
= 0 (31)
∂L
∂Nt+1
= −λt+1Rt+1 ∂gt+1
∂Nt+1
+ νt+1 − νt
β
= 0. (32)
We begin our detailed analysis with the last regime, describing economic growth
once the technological limit in energy production is reached.
The long run endogenous growth economy
In the last regime, the model becomes a simple endogenous growth model with in-
vestment only in physical capital. For all t ≥ T2, The second part of the Lagrangian
formula applies. The first-order conditions (23), (24) and (29) still hold, except the
one with respect to B simplifies to:
∂L
∂Bt
= t − Γ2λt = 0. (33)
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Given t = Γ2λt from (33), we could get the Euler equation combining with (23)
and (29),
c−γt
βc−γt+1
= (1− Γ2)A+ 1− δ = A¯. (34)
And the resource constraint changes to
ct + it + Γ2Bt = Akt. (35)
By solving the equations (34), (35) and the difference equation with k, one will
have
kt+1 + ct = A¯kt. (36)
Then the problem can be solved analytically ∀t ≥ T2, to get the limiting policy
function:
kt+1 = (βA¯)
1/γkt. (37)
According to the definition, H reaches its upper limit at T2, and for all t ≥ T2, we
have
Ht = Γ
−1/α
2 − Γ1. (38)
116
Renewable regime with technology progress
Working backwards in time, we consider next the regime where B = Ak > 0, j > 0
and H < Γ
−1/α
2 − Γ1. In this regime, the economy just transits from fossil fuel
energy to renewable energy, and the energy cost declines by both learning by doing
and direct investment in technology progress. There are two state variables in this
regime: the physical capital k and the cumulative knowledge in renewable energy
sector H. First-order conditions (23) to (25), (28) to (30) apply.
Observing from (25), so long as B > 0 we must also have jψλ ≥ (1− ψ)ηBψ > 0.
Also, when j > 0, it must satisfy
jt = [(1− ψt)(ηt/λt)]1/ψBt, (39)
Hence, j also becomes positive for the first time at T1 and we must also have H = 0
at T1.
Substituting the expression of  into (29) and combining the result with equations
(23) and (24), we obtain the first Euler equation18,
c−γt
βc−γt+1
= A− (Γ1 +Ht+1)−αA+ 1− δ + ψjt+1
(1− ψ)kt+1 . (40)
The second Euler equation could be obtained from (23), (24), (25) and (30):
c−γt
βc−γt+1
= Aψkψt j
−ψ
t
[
(1− ψ)αAkt+1(Γ1 +Ht+1)−α−1 + A−ψk−ψt+1jψt+1
]
. (41)
Once the Euler equations are solved with resource constraint (1.11), state equa-
18Where jt+1 = (Hˆ −Ht+1) 11−ψ (Akt+1)−
ψ
1−ψ for all t < T2 − 1. Note that eliminating jt+1 brings
the “two-period-ahead” value of H, denoted as Hˆ. Hence, we will have jT2 = 0.
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tions (2.7) and (2.10), and appropriate boundary conditions, we can attain the opti-
mum policy paths.
Fossil Fuel Economy Regime
Finally, we consider the initial regime where R > 0. Then (27) implies ξ = 0 and the
shadow price of energy will be
 = λg(S,N)− σQ. (42)
The co-state variable σ = 0 at T1 since S has no effect once fossil fuels cease to be
used. Also, because an increase in S raises the cost of fossil fuel while fossil fuels are
used, σ is negative for t < T1. Hence, (27) implies that the shadow price of energy
exceeds λg(S,N) for t < T1 but converges to it as t → T1. Thus, at T1, (42), (28)
and continuity of the shadow price of energy at T1 require
t = λtgt(S,N) = λtΓ
−α
1 − ψηtBψ−1t j1−ψt . (43)
In particular, (43) implies that the transition from fossil fuels to renewable energy
will occur when the mining cost of fossil fuel energy, g(S,N), is strictly less than the
initial cost of renewable energy Γ−α1 . Thus, the benefits of learning by doing make it
worthwhile to transit to renewable energy before the cost of fossil fuels reaches parity
with the cost of renewable energy.
While we have proved we cannot have zero direct R&D investment j in renewable
sector while the production B is positive in previous section, we do have a regime
where investment in fossil fuel technology n = 0 while fossil fuels continue to be used
(R > 0). Specifically, since changes in N , like changes in S, have no effect once the
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economy abandons fossil fuels at T1, the co-state variable ν corresponding to N will
be zero. On the other hand, (24) implies λ = q > 0, so from (26), ω = λ− ν > 0. For
t < T1, increases in N will reduce fossil fuel mining costs and raise the maximized
value of the objective subject to the constraints. So that ν > 0 along the time. As we
move backwards in time from T1, ν will be increasing while λ is decreasing. Hence,
we will arrive at a time T0 < T1 when ν = λ, and for t < T0 we will have n > 0 in
addition to R > 0. From (26), we will also continue to have ν = λ for t < T0.
For the period [T0, T1] with n = 0, Nt = Nt+1. The first-order conditions (23),
(24), (27), (29), and (31) apply.
Substituting (42) into (29), with (23) and (24), we have an Euler equation in fossil
fuel regime:
c−γt
βc−γt+1
= (1− gt+1 + σt+1Qt+1
λt+1
)A+ 1− δ. (44)
And the resource constraint is simplified as
ct + it + g(St, Nt)Rt = yt. (45)
Given state equations (2.7), (2.9), (31), (44) and (45), the dynamic system could
be solved in this period.
For the period [0, T0] with n > 0, besides the Euler equation (44), equation (26)
now can be used as well. From equation (23), (26) and (32), we have another Euler
equation:
c−γt
βc−γt+1
= 1− ∂gt+1
∂Nt+1
Akt+1 (46)
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With equations (2.8) and (46) that are only true in this period, plus all state
equations used in previous period, we could solve this equation system and obtain
the optimal policy paths.
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